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This report is dedicated to the survivors of sexual violence
and their brave and honorable struggle against impunity.
1Executive Summary
“ Analysis reveals commonalities in the ways that the Indian justice system failed to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish 
perpetrators of sexual violence or to provide 
effective redress to female victims.
A 2014 report by the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women on gender-based crimes 
describes the female experience in India as consist-
ing of a “continuum of violence . . . from the ‘womb 
to the tomb.’”1  According to Indian government 
data, a woman is raped in the country approxi-
mately every twenty minutes.2  Women and girls 
are especially vulnerable to sexual violence during 
armed conflict and mass violence.  Indeed, gender-
based crime is a common feature of the armed 
conflict and mass violence that has marred India 
since independence.
Access to Justice for Women: India’s Response to 
Sexual Violence in Conflict and Social Upheaval 
examines emblematic case examples from conflict 
zones and incidents of mass violence to under-
stand how the Indian State responds to sexual 
violence against women and girls in these contexts. 
The goal of this Report is to analyze the efforts of 
women victims of sexual violence and their allies 
to access justice in these contexts and to identify 
emblematic ways the Indian legal system succeeded 
or failed to provide effective redress. 
Two of the case studies are drawn from contexts 
of conflict, in the states of Punjab, and Jammu & 
Kashmir ( J&K); two of the case studies are drawn 
from seminal incidences of mass violence in the 
states of Gujarat in 2002 and Odisha in 2008 
(formerly called Orissa).  While the report focuses 
on the internal dimensions of conflicts, those in 
Punjab and J&K have cross-border and interna-
tional dimensions. 
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The selected case examples span time and place, 
involve different national and local minority com-
munities, different forms of sexual violence and 
perpetrators, arise from different political contexts, 
and result in different legal outcomes.  In particu-
lar, the history of partition of India and Pakistan 
in 1947 significantly defines the conflicts in Punjab 
and J&K, and deeply rooted cultural and political 
dynamics undergird the incidents of mass violence 
in Gujarat and Odisha. 
Despite the complexities presented by these differ-
ences, analysis reveals commonalities among the 
cases in the ways that the Indian justice system 
failed to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish 
perpetrators of sexual violence or to provide effec-
tive redress to female victims.  Impunity was the 
norm even when members of state security forces 
carried out the crimes. 
The international community recently has placed 
greater emphasis on legal accountability for sexual 
violence by strengthening relevant institutions 
and standards.  This Report aims to contribute to 
greater accountability for sexual violence crimes 
against women and girls by examining India’s 
response to exemplary incidents of such attacks. 
The Report uses the case examples to explore legal 
and institutional obstacles to effective criminal 
investigation, prosecution, and reparation of 
gender-based crimes against women along nine 
dimensions of the Indian legal system: criminal-
ization, prevention, contextual analysis, reporting, 
registration of complaints and arrests, collection of 
evidence, timeliness, legal immunity, and redress. It 
applies international standards to identify central 
weaknesses of India’s legal system and offers rec-
ommendations to correct those deficiencies. 
Based on this analysis and applicable international 
standards, the Report recommends that India: 
* Amend Indian criminal law and employ interna-
tional criminal and human rights legal standards 
to define rape and related provisions as a violation 
of bodily integrity and a crime of violence, rather 
than a crime against modesty.  Indian criminal law 
should also recognize the coercive circumstances in 
custodial situations and armed conflict.
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* Adopt legislation that provides a comprehensive, 
equitable, and efficient system of reparations for 
victims of sexual violence in internal conflict or 
incidences of mass violence.  India should provide 
adequate, timely, and comprehensive reparations to 
victims of gender-based crimes and their families, 
including monetary compensation; rehabilitation, 
such as medical care and psychological and psy-
chosocial support; measures of satisfaction, such as 
public acknowledgment of wrongdoing, memorial-
ization, and historical analysis of commitments; 
and measures of guarantees of non-repetition, 
including effective criminal investigation and the 
prosecution and punishment of those responsible. 
* Ensure acts of sexual violence in areas of internal 
conflict and incidences of mass violence are exhaus-
tively and effectively investigated and those respon-
sible are promptly prosecuted and punished by a 
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal. 
India must repeal legislation, such as the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (with subsequent 
amendments), and sections of the Indian Code of 
Criminal Procedure, including Section 197, that do 
not permit the trial or prosecution of paramilitary 
and military personnel without government per-
mission.3 These laws encumber the investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of public officials 
and members of the armed forces. In particular, 
it is imperative that India strengthens its efforts 
to effectively investigate and prosecute historic 
crimes, such as the acts of sexual violence that 
occurred in J&K, to signal a break with the legacy 
of impunity and ensure victims’ access to justice. 
To this end, India should increase resources to 
the judicial system to address the backlog of cases 
and establish an effective protection program for 
victims and witness. 
* Impose criminal and administrative sanctions on 
public officials, including elected officials, military 
personnel, and police officers who obstruct inves-
tigations or intimidate, harass, or assault victims 
and witnesses of sexual violence that occurred 
during internal conflict or mass violence. Authori-
ties should initiate disciplinary proceedings against 
public officials who perpetrate or fail in their duties 
to respond to sexual violence, including investigat-
ing officials who fail to follow investigative pro-
cedure by, for example, refusing to register First 
Information Reports.  India also should adopt 
steps to dismantle the esprit du corps, prevalent 
among police and military forces, that contrib-
utes to a climate of impunity in which members of 
the police and military may harass and intimidate 
victims and witnesses or their families without 
consequence.
* Implement specialized investigative units, pros-
ecutors, and courts to respond to, investigate, and 
prosecute acts of sexual violence in internal conflict 
and incidences of mass violence. India must ensure 
that individuals responsible for inciting and com-
mitting acts of sexual and collective violence are 
held criminally accountable.  India should increase 
institutional capacity to effectively prosecute and 
punish perpetrators of sexual violence and care for 
victims of conflict and mass violence by creating 
specialized police units to investigate crimes of 
sexual violence, increasing the number of female 
police officers and medical examiners, establish-
ing specialized units within prosecutors’ offices, 
and strengthening specialized courts to address 
the backlog of cases and ensure the independence 
and impartiality of investigations and prosecu-
tions.  India must ensure that the rights of prison-
ers serving sentences are respected.  
* Adopt effective witness-victim protection measures 
to enable victims and witnesses of sexual violence, 
including state officials, in areas of internal conflict 
and incidences of mass violence to participate fully 
and safely in proceedings. Measures must take into 
account the particular vulnerabilities of victims of 
sexual violence in these contexts and may include 
relocation assistance, privacy protections, and 
other security measures to ensure protection from 
retaliation or intimidation, and physical and psy-
chological safety.
* Train officials involved in sexual violence cases, 
including police, medical personnel, and judicial 
officers, for the unique challenges of working in 
areas of internal conflict and mass violence and 
to appropriately support victims and sensitively 
conduct their duties. This should include effective 
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efforts to standardize medical forensic examination 
procedures and train medical personnel to com-
petently conduct exams.  For example, although 
Indian courts have rejected the legal validity of 
the “two-finger” vaginal test, it is still used. India 
should take steps to eliminate practices that re-
traumatize victims of sexual violence. 
The Report’s recommendations are confined by its 
focus and do not, for example, examine theories 
of criminal liability for sexual violence or sexual 
violence committed against women outside of 
internal armed conflict and mass social violence.
Introduction
“ Only on the rarest of occasions does a female victim of sexual violence in areas of conflict or mass violence succeed in bringing 
her case through the Indian justice system. 
More typically, her efforts to secure justice are 
disregarded or even thwarted by the State.
Sexual violence against women in situations of 
armed conflict and mass violence has garnered 
increased attention by the international commu-
nity.  Defined as a “serious abuse[] of a sexual nature 
inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of 
a person by means of coercion, threat of force or 
intimidation in a way that is degrading and humil-
iating for the victim’s dignity,”4 sexual violence 
is endemic in conflicts throughout the world. 
Stigma, shame, lack of political will, and the insen-
sitivity and ineffectiveness of legal systems often 
prevent victims from obtaining justice.5  Most girls 
and women suffer the physical, mental, and social 
consequences of sexual violence in isolation and 
without adequate redress.  While this Report does 
not specifically address sexual violence perpetrated 
against lesbians, or men and boys, transgender,6 
third gender, or intersex individuals, it is important 
to note that these groups are also victims of sexual 
violence.7 
In the last two decades, the international com-
munity has placed greater emphasis on legal 
accountability for gender-based crimes commit-
ted in times of peace and conflict.  Today, the vast 
majority of nations have ratified the Convention 
to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), which protects specifically 
the rights of women.8  The International Criminal 
Court has recognized sexual violence as an inter-
national crime and expanded the definition of a 
crime against humanity to include instances of  “[r]
ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”9 
The United Nations’ Security Council has issued 
multiple resolutions calling on States to end the 
use of sexual violence as a tactic of war and the 
impunity of perpetrators.10  The United Nations 
also has developed models of best practices for 
ensuring implementation of State duties to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of 
sexual violence.11  These efforts however have failed 
to reduce significantly the pervasiveness of sexual 
violence or the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators.
The Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences (SR on 
Violence against Women) described the female 
experience in India as commonly consisting of a 
“continuum of violence . . . from the ‘womb to the 
tomb.’”12  According to Indian government data, a 
woman is raped in the country approximately every 
twenty minutes.13  Rape, mass rape, gang rape, and 
stripping of women and girls are common features 
of the social upheaval and mob violence that has 
marred post-independent India.14  
Since 1947, social upheaval and mob violence 
frequently has occurred within the context of 
on-going economic, social, and political struggles. 
In Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir ( J&K), and Gujarat, 
for example, the Indian State has responded to 
claims for political and socio-economic rights by 
Sikhs and Muslims through increased militariza-
tion, mass arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, 
forced disappearances, and rape.15  The struggle for 
human rights, including cultural rights, by Chris-
tians in Odisha (formerly called Orissa) has been 
access to justice for women
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perceived as a threat to cultural nationalism by the 
Hindu majority and has sparked episodes of mass 
violence.16  Sexual violence in these areas occurs in 
the context of the interplay of multiple dynamics 
related to gender, caste, social class, political power, 
land, and religion. 
In struggles for political power, land, or cultural 
and religious dominance, rape of women is a 
weapon to gain or consolidate power over members 
of the “enemy” or opponent group.17  Defilement of 
females in patriarchal cultures serves to assault the 
collective by publicly exposing men as weak and 
unable to protect their women or effectively assert 
the claims to sovereignty of the male-dominated 
collective.18  The chaos of conflict and widespread 
violence also creates the opportunity for rape and 
the conditions for impunity.19  Sexualized violence 
in these contexts, whether orchestrated or oppor-
tunistic, frequently occurs with the participation or 
tolerance of Indian officials.20 
Though incidents of targeted, sexualized violence 
against women and girls in the context of conflict 
and mass violence in India take different forms, 
involve different players, and display different types 
of violence, common to nearly all of these incidents 
is the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators and the 
systemic failures of the Indian justice system to 
prevent, investigate, and prosecute sexual violence 
or provide effective redress to female victims.  Only 
on the rarest of occasions does a female victim of 
sexual violence in areas of conflict or mass violence 
succeed in bringing her case through the Indian 
justice system.  More typically, her efforts to 
secure justice are disregarded or even thwarted by 
the State.  During and after of mass violence and 
conflict, the criminal justice system rarely is an ally 
in the quest for redress and frequently discrimina-
torily denies women’s access to justice.
Goals
Against this backdrop, Access to Justice for Women: 
India’s Response to Sexual Violence in Conflict and 
Social Upheaval (Report) examines four examples 
of sexual violence against women in the Indian 
states of Punjab, J&K, Gujarat, and Odisha. 
The case examples focus on the efforts of female 
victims of sexual violence and their allies to seek 
justice and the response of the Indian justice 
system to these crimes.  The four examples repre-
sent a diverse range of incidents and legal outcomes, 
all of which gained significant attention within 
each region, if not nationally and internationally. 
Through these emblematic cases, this Report aims:
•	 To identify and explore the multiple forms of 
discrimination and subordination that impact 
the experience of women and girls of sexual 
violence and their efforts at accountability;
•	 To examine the measures adopted by the 
Indian State to prevent, investigate, prosecute, 
punish, and provide redress for acts of sexual 
violence and to identify common patterns of 
weakness in the State’s response; and
•	 To apply international standards to propose 
recommendations for legal and institutional 
reforms that promote the efficacious protec-
tion of the rights of women and girls.
The goal of this Report is not to determine whether 
India’s actions or omissions constitute violations 
of its international obligations, although it does 
make note of prima facie violations of international 
human rights law recognized in official documents. 
Instead, the goal of this Report is to examine the 
efforts of women victims of sexual violence and 
their allies to access justice in particular contexts 
and to identify emblematic ways the Indian legal 
system succeeded or failed to provide effective 
redress.  This Report draws on international legal 
standards to identify systemic normative and 
institutional weaknesses that foster impunity.  To 
the extent those standards comprise efficacious 
approaches to rights protection, this Report also 
employs international human rights, humanitar-
ian, and criminal standards to suggest legal and 
institutional reforms. 
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Case Selection
This Report examines India’s responses to inci-
dents of targeted sexualized violence against 
women in the context of social upheaval or internal 
armed conflict.  
methodology 
The particular incidents selected here are aligned 
with areas of heightened conflict and mass violence 
identified by the Armed Conflict Resolution and 
People’s Rights Project at Haas-Berkeley (ACRes 
Project).  The ACRes Project identified four cases 
that exemplify general patterns of violence and dif-
ficulties faced by women during the accountability 
process and for which a legal record of the account-
ability process is available.  The cases were selected 
with the aim of identifying examples from different 
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regions and different contexts that illustrate ways 
in which the State has responded to situations of 
gender violence but that are rarely discussed in the 
same analysis.  These cases, while emblematic for 
each region, are also exceptional insofar as victims 
and their allies pursued legal accountability and 
there is a publicly available record of their efforts. 
The case study materials are drawn from primary 
legal documents and publically available secondary 
sources including scholarly articles, books, reports, 
newspapers, and official documents. In some cases, 
there are inconsistencies between official Indian 
government documents and reports by non-gov-
ernment organizations.  The Report makes note 
of significant discrepancies in the endnotes.21 The 
analysis of the four seminal cases, while indicative 
of the situation at large in each area, is not exhaus-
tive and offers a partial and limited account of 
access to justice for women
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emblematic issues.  The legal analyses of the case 
studies are based on relevant international human 
rights treaties India has ratified, namely the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),22  Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC).  Additional sources of interpretation of 
international law and standards were consulted, 
along with jurisprudence from international and 
regional human rights bodies.  
This Report does not identify victims or their 
relations by name to protect their privacy and in 
compliance with Section 228A of the Indian Penal 
Code.23  Indian law prohibits the disclosure of 
identifying information about victims of sexual 
violence.24  Although many victims of the incidents 
described in this Report wanted to be identified by 
name, all identifying information about the victims 
was redacted from the Report.
case characteristics
The incidents in Punjab, J&K, Gujarat, and Odisha 
took place at different times as well as in different 
states.  While the violence in KunanPoshpura, 
Kashmir, occurred in 1991, the rape of redact in 
Odisha took place nearly 20 years later, in 2008. 
Kashmir and Punjab lie in the north of India, 
while Odisha and Gujarat are in the east and west, 
respectively.  The incidents in J&K, and Gujarat 
each involved mass rape, while in Odisha and 
Punjab, the incidents involved individual rapes. 
In addition, all of the case examples highlight 
acts of sexual violence perpetrated by men, with 
the participation or complicity of state actors, 
against women who experienced marginalization 
not only because of their gender but also due to 
their religious affiliation and minority status.  The 
‘religionization’ of sexualized violence in these 
case examples is apparent in the victims targeted: 
military officers raped Muslim women during 
a raid of village in Kashmir, a region beset with 
violence since 1947; in Punjab, the police raped 
a Sikh woman and tortured several Sikh villag-
ers supporting her in the context of the conflict in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s; Hindu attackers 
committed mass rape and murder against Muslims 
in Gujarat in 2002 following the burning of a 
train carrying Hindu pilgrims; and a Hindu mob 
abducted and raped redacted in Odisha in 2008, 
after the assassination of a Hindu religious and 
nationalist leader. 
In all of these instances, the Indian State fell short 
of its obligations to prevent, investigate, pros-
ecute and punish, and ensure redress.  Responses 
ranged from refusing to assist victims (Gujarat 
and Odisha) to justifying violence that occurred as 
a necessary to protect ‘law and order’ against the 
threat of terrorism ( J&K and Punjab).  Some of 
the criminal cases were resolved within six years 
(Odisha), while others remain unresolved more 
than twenty years after the incident ( J&K).  The 
relative success of the legal procedures imple-
mented—measured by convictions of perpetra-
tors, compensation received, and assurances of 
protection—likewise vary significantly.  In each 
case, the actions of the police and the legal system 
raise concerns about the protection of the rights of 
minority women.  
International Legal 
Standards
Introduction
In recent years, the international legal community 
has increased emphasis on examining the nature of 
gender-based crimes and strengthened its efforts 
to develop human rights standards focused specifi-
cally on protecting the rights of women and girls 
regarding sexual violence.  In instances of sus-
tained conflict, for example, it has expanded crimes 
against humanity to include “[r]ape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity.”25  The common thread among 
international efforts is the critical understanding 
that sexual violence against women and girls is not 
only a crime but also a violation of international 
human rights standards.  In India, this expansion 
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implicates not only domestic law26 but also binding 
international law it has ratified.
relevant international instruments
Many international instruments, including treaties, 
address the human rights of women,27 the most 
notable of which are the ICCPR and CEDAW.28 
In general, these treaties aim to define the various 
forms of discrimination to which individuals may 
be subject and establish rights protecting individu-
als from those various and intersecting discrimina-
tions.  According to both treaties, State Parties are 
obligated to ensure the protection of women’s right 
to personal integrity and the prevention of sexual 
violence against women as a form of gender-based 
discrimination.  India acceded to the ICCPR on 
April 10, 1979;29 it ratified CEDAW on July 9, 
1993.30  As a State Party to each, India is bound by 
these treaty provisions. 
At its core, the ICCPR codifies legal human rights 
standards considered to be the “natural yardstick for 
the drafting of . . . fundamental rights” in national 
constitutions.31  Notably, the ICCPR codifies the 
human right of individuals, including women and 
children, to protection from “advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred” resulting in “incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence.”32  Where 
sexual violence and gender-based discrimination 
frequently intersect with one of these other forms 
of hatred, the ICCPR becomes a critical tool for 
establishing wrongdoing.
While the ICCPR provides general, codified 
human rights standards for all persons, CEDAW 
focuses specifically on the protection of women.33 
The United Nations considers CEDAW to be a 
major platform for addressing gender-based dis-
crimination as a human rights violation and has 
now incorporated sexual violence against women 
as a form of discrimination under the treaty.34 As 
it pertains to sexual violence against women during 
conflict, CEDAW specifies that States shall take 
“all appropriate measures” to “modify the social and 
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudi-
cial customs and all other practices which are based 
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men 
and women.”35  According to the CEDAW General 
Recommendations, the Convention requires that 
States protect women against violence of any kind 
including the use of targeted sexual or gender-
based violence as a tool for establishing hierar-
chies between genders.36  Recognizing that sexual 
violence is a violation of human rights at any time, 
the CEDAW General Recommendations can thus 
be understood to apply to sexual violence in situa-
tions of mass upheaval.
Since CEDAW came into force, the international 
community has increasingly focused on violence 
against women in domestic and intimate settings, 
and in times of conflict, as a human rights viola-
tion.  These efforts are manifest in the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, as 
well as in several General Assembly resolutions 
focused specifically on targeted sexual violence 
against women.37  In addition to CEDAW, the CRC 
contains several provisions particularly relevant to 
female child victims of sexual violence during situ-
ations of civil unrest and armed conflict.  The CRC 
specifies that State Parties must “protect the child 
from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual 
abuse.”38  The explicit language used in this article 
makes clear that human rights law prohibits sexual 
abuse against children under any circumstances.39 
Additionally, during times of armed conflict where 
international humanitarian law also applies, the 
CRC specifies that State Parties must “ensure 
respect for [the] rules of international humanitar-
ian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which 
are relevant to the child.”40  This provision includes 
the obligation of the State to protect children from 
acts of sexual violence, as well as a general obliga-
tion of the State to minimize harm to civilians, 
including children.41 
Overall, international human rights treaties and 
declarations stress that women are frequently 
subject to “double and triple marginalization,” 
stemming from “multiple intersecting or aggravated 
forms of discrimination,” including gender-based 
discrimination, which intersects with discrimina-
tion based on “otherness” (race, ethnicity, religion, 
and economic status).42 Consequently, States must 
access to justice for women
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be mindful that in responding to crimes of sexual 
violence, they do not inadvertently re-victimize 
and thus take measures to ensure that remedies 
take into account the identity of the victim and the 
nature of the trauma they have experienced.
State Obligations 
When a State ratifies a human rights treaty, the 
legal obligations of the treaty become binding on 
the State Party as a whole, imposing a general obli-
gation to respect the rights laid out in the treaty 
and to ensure such rights to all individuals under 
the State’s jurisdiction.43  The ICCPR, CEDAW, 
and other international treaties firmly establish 
sexual and gender-based violence as a human rights 
violation.  International law holds that States must 
use due diligence to respond to instances of such 
violence against women.44  According to CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 19, due diligence 
requires States to prevent, investigate, punish, and 
provide compensation for acts of violence against 
women in accordance with national legislation, 
regardless of whether state or private actors com-
mitted the acts.45 
duty to prevent
As elaborated by the SR on Violence against 
Women, the duty to protect requires States to 
use “all means of a legal, political, administra-
tive and cultural nature to promote the protec-
tion of human rights and ensure that violations 
are considered and treated as illegal acts, leading 
to the punishment of responsible parties and the 
indemnification of victims.”46  This duty gives rise 
to a further affirmative duty to prevent the occur-
rence of sexual and gender-based crimes against 
women.47 
By the same token, CEDAW requires that all 
State Parties provide legal protection to the rights 
of women on the same level as men, ensure that 
public authorities and institutions refrain from any 
acts of discrimination against women, and adopt 
legislative and other measures that prohibit gender 
discrimination, including sanctions where appro-
priate.48  As explained above, CEDAW General 
Recommendation No. 19 makes clear that “[g]
ender-based violence is a form of discrimination 
that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy 
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with 
men.”49  In its 2014 review of India’s compliance 
with CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee called on 
India to enforce legislation relating specifically to 
violence against women.50
duty to investigate 
“ When a State ratifies a human rights treaty, the legal obligations of the treaty become binding on the State Party as a whole, 
imposing a general obligation to respect the 
rights laid out in the treaty and to ensure 
such rights to all individuals under the State’s 
jurisdiction.  The ICCPR, CEDAW, and 
other international treaties firmly establish 
sexual and gender-based violence as a human 
rights violation.  International law holds that 
States must use due diligence to respond to 
instances of such violence against women.
The duty to investigate requires States to provide 
victims of human rights violations with a prompt, 
impartial, thorough, and independent official 
investigation.51  The duty arises from the State’s 
obligation to protect all individuals under its juris-
diction from acts committed by private or public 
persons that may infringe on their enjoyment 
of human rights.52  It places the burden to carry 
out investigations on the State, requiring them 
to perform investigations regardless of whether 
victims or their family members file complaints.53 
The burden requires States to perform an investi-
gation but does not require the State to produce a 
specific result.54  As such, the duty is not necessar-
ily violated if an investigation fails to lead to the 
complete clarification of the facts and legal conse-
quences surrounding a violation, so long as author-
ities carry out the investigation in accordance with 
international standards.55 
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According to an authoritative guide drafted by the 
International Commission of Jurists, international 
standards require a criminal investigation to meet 
the following eight discrete requirements:
i Investigations must be independent and 
impartial; 
ii Investigations must be capable of leading 
to the identification and, if appropriate, 
punishment of perpetrators; 
iii Authorities must have the resources and 
powers necessary to complete an effec-
tive investigation; 
iv Victims and their relatives must have 
the right to effective participation in 
investigations; 
v States must provide protection against 
threat or intimidation to victims, rela-
tives, and witnesses; 
vi Investigations must collect and 
document all evidence and disclose the 
facts of the violation and its causes, 
along with the methods, evidence, and 
results of the investigation to victims, 
their relatives, and the public; 
vii States must suspend from duty any 
officials suspected of involvement in the 
violations; and 
viii Concluding reports must be made 
public immediately.56
Drawn from criteria established by United Nations 
human rights bodies and regional courts, these 
investigative standards reflect international law 
and best practices.
The CEDAW Committee has raised concerns 
about India’s execution of the duty to investigate. In 
its Concluding Observations on India, the Commit-
tee urged the State to “strengthen the efficiency of 
the police, to ensure that police officers fulfill their 
duty to protect women and girls against violence 
and are held accountable, to adopt standard pro-
cedures for the police in each state on gender-sen-
sitive investigations and treatment of victims and 
of witnesses, and to ensure that first information 
reports are duly filed.”57 
duty to prosecute and punish 
The duty to prosecute and punish is rooted pri-
marily in the interest in combating impunity and 
denying amnesty through an effective judiciary.58 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has recognized a state duty 
to prevent impunity and hold perpetrators and 
accomplices liable.59  States must not prevent 
prosecution by granting amnesty to parties or by 
relying on prior immunity or indemnity.60  The 
Human Rights Committee has likewise declared 
that States cannot provide amnesty or immunity 
to perpetrators; that States must cooperate in 
bringing suspects of gross human rights or serious 
humanitarian law violations to justice; and that 
States’ main obligation is criminal sanctions against 
guilty parties, complemented by disciplinary 
measures.61  The SR on Violence against Women 
specifically highlighted the problem of impunity 
in India for police officers that committed gender 
violence.62  Where necessary, States must adopt or 
amend legislation to provide national courts with 
universal jurisdiction over serious crimes under 
international law.63 
The duty to prosecute does not guarantee a pros-
ecution or provide victims with any rights against 
the perpetrator.64  Under this obligation, however, 
the State has a duty to prosecute individuals sus-
pected of involvement in human rights violations65 
and to punish those found guilty.66  The Human 
Rights Committee has noted that a failure to bring 
perpetrators to justice could give rise to a breach of 
the ICCPR.67 
The UN General Assembly has declared that 
States should ensure victims’ rights by establish-
ing judicial and administrative mechanisms “to 
enable victims to obtain redress through formal 
or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, 
inexpensive and accessible” and “develop ways and 
means of providing recourse for victims where 
national channels may be insufficient.”68  While the 
State has the primary responsibility in deciding to 
access to justice for women
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prosecute, victims have the right to become civil 
parties to the case or, if the State declines to prose-
cute, bring proceedings themselves where the State 
recognizes private prosecutions.69  States must 
provide broad legal standing to wronged parties 
and to any individual or non-governmental organi-
zation with a legitimate interest in the violation.70
duty to ensure redress 
“ To be effective, a remedy must provide real, rather than illusory, access to justice. 
The duty to ensure redress includes a requirement 
that remedies be prompt and effective, providing 
meaningful access to justice for victims.71  The 
United Nations has recognized that any individual 
whose rights or freedoms ensured by the ICCPR 
are violated has the right to an effective remedy.72 
Under the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, victims are 
entitled to prompt redress for the harm they have 
suffered73 through access to the criminal justice 
system, services to assist their recovery, and repara-
tions.74  To be effective, a remedy must provide real, 
rather than illusory, access to justice.75 
Effective redress is often denied to Indian victims 
of gender violence because of the low rates of 
prosecution and conviction for such acts.76  The 
CEDAW Committee and the SR on Violence 
against Women have both called on India to enact 
legislation that addresses communal violence by 
adopting gender-sensitive, victim-centered pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules and reparations 
regimes.77 
Indian Laws and 
Institutions
The Indian judiciary, a single integrated system, 
has three main hierarchical levels: subordinate 
courts, High Courts with jurisdiction over one 
or more states, and the Supreme Court, which is 
the court of last resort in constitutional, civil, and 
criminal matters.78  Although primarily a court 
of appeals, the Supreme Court also has original 
jurisdiction over writs alleging violations of fun-
damental rights.79  Supreme Court decisions are 
binding on India’s lower courts.80  Decisions by 
High Courts—the head of judicial administration 
for states—are binding in the respective state juris-
dictions, but not on other High Courts.81  India’s 
district courts adjudicate civil and criminal cases.82 
The jurisdiction on criminal matters of district 
courts, referred to as Sessions Courts, depends 
upon the severity of the crime and punishment. 
Sessions courts usually have jurisdiction over rape 
and forced sodomy cases.83  The state government 
may also direct a Sessions Court to function as 
a human rights court for the purpose of trying 
offenses arising out of violations of human rights.84 
Subordinate courts of Judicial Magistrates have 
jurisdiction over “crimes against modesty.”85 The 
jurisdiction on civil matters of the district courts 
depends upon territorial limitations and the 
matter’s pecuniary value.86 Victims of violations 
of fundamental rights may seek redress through 
India’s system of Public Interest Litigation (PIL).87 
Criminalization of Sexual Violence
Indian law criminalizes sexualized violence as 
rape or “assault or criminal force to woman with 
intent to outrage her modesty.”88  From 1860, when 
British India’s first criminal code was enacted, 
until 1983, Indian criminal provisions related to 
sexual violence remained largely unchanged.89  In 
1983, an acquittal in a highly publicized case of a 
teenaged girl raped by a police constable spurred 
legal reform.90
The 1983 amendments in force at the time of the 
incidents described by this Report, criminalized 
rape as penile-vaginal penetration, committed 
by a man upon a woman, without her consent.91 
Non-vaginal penetration or penetration with an 
object or finger did not constitute rape but an 
“unnatural offence” or an “assault or criminal force 
to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.”92 
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a court.105  Any officer who receives information 
about a cognizable offense, such as rape or crimes 
against modesty, is required to document the 
information in writing and file the FIR with the 
competent court.106  Police officers are required 
to promptly investigate cognizable offenses or 
document the reasons the investigation was not 
undertaken.107  A judge may investigate an offense 
based on an FIR, a complaint of facts, information 
received from a person other than a police officer, 
or personal knowledge of an offense.108 
Following the investigation, the judge considers the 
record and the prosecution’s opening statements. 
If the judge decides that trial should continue, the 
judge “frames the charge” and the defendant enters 
a plea.109  If the defendant pleads not guilty, the 
judge hears evidence from the prosecution and the 
defense and then renders a judgment of guilty or 
innocent.110  Under the Indian Code of Criminal 
Procedure, a court may impose a sentence, fines, 
and/or order payment of restitution to the 
victim.111  Most convicted offenders are unable to 
pay restitution.112  
No standard for forensic medical exams existed 
in India at the time of the incidents discussed in 
this Report.  Prior to 2000, medical personnel only 
performed forensic medical examinations of rape 
victims if requested by police or a court.  Doctors 
at hospitals routinely refused to examine women 
who were the victims of sexual violence113 and 
were vulnerable to intimidation to compel changes 
to examination results.114  Medical examiners used 
the “two-finger test” during rape exams despite 
judicial decisions refuting the test’s validity.115 
Civil Remedies
The civil recourse for human rights violations 
under Indian statutory and common law is tort 
remedy—typically the tort of public misfeasance, 
trespass to the person, or assault and battery— 
but tort remedies have not been pursued in sexual 
assault cases.116  Sovereign immunity and other 
laws shield public officials, police, and military 
from civil suits117 and common law remedies are 
Under reforms enacted in 1983, the offense of rape 
became cognizable—a crime for which police may 
arrest a suspect without warrant93—and non-bail-
able.94  The 1983 law also criminalized, for the first 
time, aggravated forms of rape, such as gang rape, 
rape of a minor, and custodial rape.95  Addition-
ally, if a victim testified that she did not consent, 
under the 1983 law, the court must presume a lack 
of consent.96  After 1983, a rape conviction was 
subject to a mandatory minimum of seven years 
and the possibility of life imprisonment, and aggra-
vated rape carried a mandatory minimum of ten 
years.97  A conviction of “assault or criminal force 
to woman with intent to outrage her modesty” 
carried no minimum, and a maximum sentence of 
two years.98  The crime of  “unnatural offenses”—an 
anti-sodomy law—carried no minimum sentence, 
and a maximum of life imprisonment.99  At the 
time of the incidents described by this Report, 
Indian law did not explicitly criminalize attempted 
rape or marital rape of wives over fifteen years 
old.100 
The high profile New Delhi gang rape in 2012 
sparked widespread protests and calls for reform 
which led India to enact the Criminal Law (Amend-
ment) Act, 2013.101 By amending Indian criminal 
law and procedure, the Act introduced important 
reforms to how crimes of sexual violence are inves-
tigated and prosecuted by India’s criminal justice 
system. The Act expands the definition of rape to 
include penetration of the labia majora, urethra, 
mouth, or anus with any object or body part, 
including the mouth, or any parts of the victim’s 
body.102  It also defines consent as “an unequivocal 
voluntary agreement” and does not require physical 
resistance to show lack of consent.103  Additionally, 
the Act establishes longer and harsher sentences 
for crimes of sexual violence.104  The Act only 
applies to acts of sexual violence by men against 
women and did not criminalize marital rape.
Criminal Procedure
A criminal investigation in India begins with the 
filing of a police report, called the First Informa-
tion Report (FIR), or by a complaint directly to 
access to justice for women
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not used in Indian human rights litigation against 
the State and its officials.118  
Victims of violations of fundamental rights, or 
any person or organization on their behalf, may 
seek redress through India’s system of Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL).119  PIL is a unique type 
of legal action created by members of the Indian 
Supreme Court “to promote and vindicate public 
interest which demands that violations of consti-
tutional or legal rights of large numbers of people 
who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economi-
cally disadvantaged position should not go unno-
ticed and unredressed.”120  The PIL system has no 
formal pleading121 or standing requirements122 and 
the Court may initiate a PIL suo motu.123 Parties 
seeking to initiate a PIL may petition the Supreme 
Court or High Courts by sending a complaint, a 
letter, or even a newspaper article. 
PIL has successfully been used in cases of sexual 
assault, including cases of gang rape by state 
actors.124  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that rape is a violation of the fundamental 
right to life and liberty.125  The Supreme Court 
has also “tak[en] operational control of failing gov-
ernment institutions and requir[ed] systematic 
efforts to mitigate the effects of past injustices.”126 
It has ordered states to suspend public officials or 
impose other disciplinary actions, directed author-
ities to institute criminal investigations and pros-
ecutions,127 and rejected the defense of sovereign 
immunity in cases involving violations of constitu-
tional rights.128 
Non-Judicial Remedies 
In cases of sexual violence in India, the National 
Commission for Women (NCW), the State Com-
mission for Women (SCW), the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC), the State Human 
Rights Commission (SHRC), and the National 
Commission for Minorities (NCM) receive indi-
vidual and collective petitions by victims, submit 
reports to Indian state governments with prelimi-
nary comments and recommendations, intervene 
to conduct fact-finding missions, and file peti-
tions before various courts, including the Supreme 
Court.129  The NCW was created in 1992 to inves-
tigate the deprivation of women’s rights and the 
failure of the Indian government to implement 
laws, policies, guidelines, or instructions ensuring 
women’s rights.130  The NCW may also intervene 
in court cases and fund litigation involving issues 
affecting women.131  In 1999, the NCW received 
4,329 complaints involving sexual harassment, 
torture, rape, refusal to register a FIR, and gender 
discrimination.132 
In 1993, following national and international 
concern about human rights violations commit-
ted during the conflicts in Punjab, J&K, and the 
northeastern states, India created the NHRC and 
fourteen SHRCs.133  The NHRC and SHRC have 
the authority to investigate complaints of human 
rights violations, but must initiate the investigation 
within one year of the alleged violation.134  In 2000, 
the NHRC received over 70,000 complaints.135  
Both the NHRC and SHRC are authorized to 
subpoena witnesses, compel discovery, obtain 
public records from any court or office, and form 
commissions to examine witnesses or docu-
ments.136  A government office or agency must 
support the investigative work of human rights 
commissions.137  The NHRC and SHRC investi-
gating officers can summon individuals to be inter-
viewed, require discovery, and request any public 
record.138  The officer is required to submit a report 
to the respective state or national human rights 
commission for publication.139  If the human rights 
commission determines a violation has occurred, 
it may make recommendations to the government 
agency involved.140  Commissions may recommend 
payment of compensation to victims or family 
members, disciplinary proceedings against officials, 
criminal prosecutions of perpetrators, and imple-
mentation of other measures to prevent the repeti-
tion of violations.141  The NHRC and SHRC also 
have authority to intervene in human rights cases 
pending before Indian courts.142  Both national 
and state human rights institutions have limited 
authority to investigate members of the Indian 
Armed Forces involved in human rights violations. 
The NHRC may not independently investigate a 
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member of India’s security forces but may request 
a report from the national government.143  Based 
on this report, the NHRC may issue confidential 
recommendations to the national government.144 
The national government must inform the NHRC 
of any action taken to implement the NHRC rec-
ommendations within a pre-determined period of 
time.145  The SHRCs may not investigate or request 
information from national government in cases 
involving the military.146  However, in Kashmir, 
for example, the SHRC has acted on matters that 
reportedly involve the military.147  The NCM was 
created in 1992 to monitor the implementation of 
constitutional and other legal safeguards in India 
designed to protect the rights of minorities in both 
central and state governments.148  The Indian gov-
ernment has recognized six religious communities 
as “minorities,” including Muslims, Christians, and 
Sikhs.149  The NCM submits reports and makes 
public recommendations to the national govern-
ment.150  When reviewing complaints, the NCM 
has “all the powers of a civil court trying a suit;” 
like the NHRC and SHRC, the NCM is autho-
rized to subpoena witnesses, compel discovery, 
obtain public records from any court or office, 
and form commissions to examine witnesses or 
documents.151  In a two-month period in 2014, 
the NCM received a total of 366 complaints from 
Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs.152
Case Examples
Punjab
context
Between 1984-1995, Punjab was impacted by 
widespread and armed conflict between Indian 
state actors and Sikh separatist groups. Conflict-
related issues recur intermittently in the present.  
By 1984, the demands for increased state 
autonomy since 1947 had intensified and com-
munication between the national government in 
New Delhi and the Sikh leadership ceased. In 
response, the Indian army launched Operation 
Bluestar and deployed over 250,000 troops during 
the height of the operation.153  Widespread reports 
of mass arrests, extrajudicial killings, forced dis-
appearances, torture, and indiscriminate raids 
of rural villages soon surfaced.154  The operation 
included assaults on Gurudwaras—Sikh places of 
worship—located throughout Punjab.155  Accord-
ing to official government reports, 492 civilians 
were killed during the operation.156  Non-gov-
ernment sources estimate that between 4,000-
8,000 civilians were killed.157   The Armed Forces 
(Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act 
of 1983, repealed in 1997, shielded participat-
ing members of the armed forces from prosecu-
tion.158  In October 1984, then Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi, who ordered Operation Bluestar, 
was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards.159 
Anti-Sikh violence ensued across India.  In the 
capital city of New Delhi alone, 2,733 to 3,000 
Sikhs were killed in the span of three days.160
Following Operation Bluestar, Sikh militant 
groups used armed resistance.  Indian state forces 
committed enforced disappearances, extrajudicial 
executions, and clandestine mass cremations of 
civilians.161  International NGOs reported that 
police officials routinely arrested and tortured 
Sikh women suspected of having information 
about male relatives’ alleged involvement in Sikh 
groups, or giving food or shelter to suspected Sikh 
militants.162  
Security forces also systematically used sexual 
violence against women to punish and terrorize 
entire communities.163  The case examined by this 
Report is one example. 
On the morning of  February 9, 1989, in this context 
of political violence and armed clashes, Sikh sepa-
ratists allegedly murdered a popular principal of a 
secondary school in Village redacted.164  Later that 
morning, police officers illegally and arbitrarily 
detained a Sikh woman who worked at a local 
hospital, xxx xxxx redacted for allegedly harboring 
those responsible for the principal’s murder. 
incident
In the early hours of February 9, 1989, thousands 
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the Inspector General of Police of Punjab ordered 
a Deputy Superintendent of Police to record 
victim and witness statements, but the police did 
not arrest or discipline the accused officers.180  Five 
months after the rape, on July 25, 1989, redacted 
filed an initial complaint before Chief Judicial 
Magistrate redacted.181  
“ In Punjab, redacted filed her initial complaint in 1989 and, the court issued the convictions in 1997—eight years later. 
During those eight years, redacted attended 
more than 80 court hearings and lived in 
hiding for fear of retribution while officers 
allegedly tortured her family members and 
burned her home.
Almost one year after the attack, the four officers 
appeared in court for the first time.182  The police 
officers were accused of minor offenses, including 
voluntarily causing hurt, and intentional insult 
with intent to provoke breach of the peace.183  They 
pled not guilty and posted bail.184  H. Lal died 
shortly after he was released.185  redacted then peti-
tioned the High Court of Punjab & Haryana to 
charge the three officers with the more serious 
offenses of kidnapping, wrongful confinement, 
rape, and criminal intimidation.186  A year later, on 
July 29, 1991 the High Court transferred redact-
ed’s case from the Chief Judicial Magistrate 
redacted to the Chief Judicial Magistrate in 
Punjab’s capital city, Chandigarh.187  There, the 
Magistrate charged the three officers with wrongful 
confinement, kidnapping, and criminal intimida-
tion, but not rape.188  After a three-year delay, 
redacted’s case was again transferred, this time to 
Additional Sessions Judge Madaan in Chandi-
garh.189  On August 5, 1994, the accused officers 
pled not guilty to the charges.190  On July 8, 1995, 
the court added the charge of rape committed 
during communal or sectarian violence.191  The 
officers, however, were released on bail.  They failed 
to appear in court despite repeated summons, and 
gathered at the scene of the murder and some 
in the crowd alleged that “terrorists” frequented 
redacted’s house.165  Later that morning, a group 
of police led by Police Station House Officer 
Radha Krishan (SHO Krishan) entered redacted’s 
home to ask her about the location of her relative, 
redacted.166  According to court records, when 
redact was unable to provide information about her 
relative’s whereabouts, the officers illegally detained 
redacted, a woman named redacted, and a boy.167 
The detainees were taken to the murder site where 
the officers released the boy.  The two women were 
taken to the police station in redacted.168  redacted 
was released later that evening.169  At the station, 
redacted was asked to sign a blank document and 
when she refused, she was beaten and kicked by 
SHO Krishan and Police Station Head Constable 
Charanjit (SHC Charanjit).170  redacted remained 
in police custody that day and night. Police officers 
did not register her arrest or detention as required 
by law.171
Around midnight on February 10, 1989, SHO 
Krishan and SHC Charanjit entered the cell where 
redacted was detained.  After she rebuffed their 
sexual requests, the two officers raped her, one after 
the other.172  About one hour after the two officers 
left, two other officers, Assistant Police Clerks 
Kashmiri Lal (K. Lal) and Hussan Lal (H. Lal) 
entered redacted’s cell and raped her.173  redacted 
stated that SHO Krishan threatened to implicate 
her in a heinous crime if she did not remain quiet 
about the rapes.174
redacted was kept in custody until 4:30 pm on 
February 10.175  Upon release, redacted told her 
husband and redacted, a neighbor, who had been 
waiting outside of the police station, that she had 
been raped.176  redacted sought medical care at local 
hospitals but was refused assistance by attending 
physicians.177 
investigation
On February 13, 1989, redacted sent a letter to the 
Governor of Punjab describing the crimes com-
mitted by the police three days earlier.178  Police 
officers investigated the incident, but took no 
action against the accused.179  On July 17, 1989, 
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were not formally charged with rape until a year 
later.192  The case was transferred for a fourth time, 
and assigned to Additional Sessions Judge Batra in 
Chandigarh on March 14, 1997.193
trial & appeal
Eight years after the incident, the trial against 
SHO Krishan, SHC Charanjit, and K. Lal began 
before Judge Batra.  To substantiate the charges 
against the officers, the prosecution called three 
witnesses: redacted, redacted’s husband; redacted, 
a neighbor; and redacted.194  The three officers who 
testified in their defense alleged that redact was 
arrested for sheltering militants who were con-
nected to the murder of the principal, and denied 
that she was held overnight.195  Doctors from the 
two hospitals that had refused to provide redact 
medical attention testified on behalf of the defense 
that redacted had never sought medical care.196 
The judge found redacted testimony credible, 
noting that her account had remained consistent, 
from her initial letter to the Governor in 1989, to 
her testimony at trial in 1997.197  The judge also 
praised redacted’s bravery and courage, describ-
ing redacted as a “hapless” woman who belonged 
to an “illiterate village community,” but wrote to 
the Governor of Punjab requesting an investiga-
tion against the officers who were “persons of great 
authority.”198  When the governor and police failed 
to act, the judge noted that redacted resorted to the 
“cumbersome, time and money consuming process 
of filing the complaint in the court of law.”199  The 
judge also recognized that police officers had 
“harassed and tortured” potential witnesses “so 
as to prevent them” from testifying in redacted’s 
support.200  On August 14, 1997, the judge found 
the three defendants guilty of rape, kidnapping, 
and wrongful confinement and sentenced each to 
10 years in prison.201 
SHO Krishan, SHC Charanjit, and K. Lal imme-
diately appealed the convictions.202  The appeal 
alleged that redacted was a terrorist, and that she 
fabricated the rape story to “pre-empt [the] effec-
tive investigation of her involvement in the murder 
of [the principal].”203  The appeal was admitted 
on January 21, 1998, and on September 9, 1998, 
redacted petitioned the High Court to be named 
as respondent in the appeal.204  In that petition, 
redacted alleged that police officers had burned 
her home and tortured her relatives to compel 
her to withdraw her complaint.205  She also stated 
that she had attended more than 80 court hearings 
during the trial process.206
“ In that petition, redacted alleged that police officers had burned her home and tortured her relatives to compel her to 
withdraw her complaint.  She also stated 
that she had attended more than 80 court 
hearings during the trial process.
On October 3, 2000, after four years in custody, 
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana granted 
SHO Krishan’s application for bail.207  According 
to the victim’s briefs, SHO Krishan had continued 
to receive his salary while in custody, had not been 
disciplined, and had returned to the police force 
after he was released on bail.208  Between Septem-
ber 2003 and November 2005, SHO Krishan 
moved to adjourn the appeals hearing or failed to 
appear on several occasions.209  The defendants 
were detained in November 2005 after the High 
Court upheld their conviction.  The police depart-
ment later dismissed the officers from service.210
On July 4, 2013, the Supreme Court of India 
upheld the convictions.  Crediting the consistency 
of redacted’s account, and finding the officers’ 
version unreliable, the Supreme Court concluded 
that she had been detained and raped in February 
1989.211  The defendants served a sentence of 
almost six years212 and were released although 
available court records do not indicate when the 
defendants served their sentences.
While the three officers were convicted of rape, 
the process was lengthy, onerous, and dangerous 
for the victim and her family.  The police depart-
ment failed to properly investigate the incident or 
discipline the officers.  Additionally, there is no 
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evidence available that the acts of intimidation or 
torture suffered by the victim’s family were investi-
gated and those responsible punished. 
Jammu & Kashmir
context
For more than half a century, Jammu & Kashmir 
( J&K) has been the site of ongoing conflict between 
Indian security forces and local communities. J&K 
has a majority Muslim population and Hindu 
Pandits, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, and others 
comprise local minorities.  Historically, disputes 
around issues related to political autonomy, self-
determination, control over resources, and religion-
ization have sparked protests and armed conflict.213 
Since the late 1980s, armed actors have commit-
ted atrocities against the civilian populations, 
including mass killings, forced disappearances, 
mass displacement, rape, and torture.214  Security 
forces inflicted collective punishment on commu-
nities suspected of, or portrayed as, sympathiz-
ing with militants.215  During cordon-and-search 
operations, security forces routinely and indis-
criminately detained men, searched and burned 
houses, and raped women.216  Sexual violence has 
been used to “punish and humiliate” communities 
in militant occupied areas.217  The Indian govern-
ment has also used repressive policies, including 
unlawful detentions and torture, to silence politi-
cal dissent and weaken opposition parties.218  For 
example, Indian security forces reacted to militant 
bombings in 1990 by killing hundreds of unarmed 
protestors.219 
Fighting between security forces and local insur-
gent groups was most intense between 1989-2004. 
The armed militancy largely dissipated between 
2004-2007. However, during the summers of 2008 
thru 2010, major protests took place. The conflict 
continues to interrupt civilian life.220 By some 
accounts, the “years of strife have seen more than 
70,000 dead and more than 8,000 disappeared.”221 
Many victims were buried in clandestine graves.222 
J&K has been called “one of the world’s most 
militarized areas of this planet.”223  The J&K state 
constitution and laws regulate all matters in the ter-
ritory except in the areas of defense, currency, and 
foreign affairs, which remain under the control of 
the national Indian government.224  With regards 
to the sections most relevant to this Report, J&K’s 
penal code, the Ranbir Penal Code, is materially 
similar to the Indian Penal Code.  In 1990, the 
J&K state government categorized J&K as a dis-
turbed area.225  That same year, the Indian national 
government enacted The Armed Forces ( J&K) 
Special Powers Act of 1990 (AFSPA), which 
provides military officials with broad powers to 
arrest, enter, search, and seize, without warrant, 
and to use force, “even to the causing of death” in 
disturbed areas.226  The AFSPA prohibits the pros-
ecution or punishment of members of the military 
acting in disturbed areas without the express 
authorization of the national government.227  
incident
Located in the northwestern corner of the Kashmir 
Valley, in Kupwara District, the twin villages of 
Kunan and Poshpora228 are approximately ninety 
kilometers from J&K’s summer capital, Srinagar.229 
On February 23, 1991 at approximately 11:00 
p.m., villagers reported that approximately 125 
soldiers of the Fourth Rajputana Rifles and the 
Sixty-Eighth Mountain Brigade cordoned off 
the villages and forcibly removed the male villag-
ers from their homes and detained them in two 
houses.230  While army personnel interrogated and 
tortured the men,231 small groups of soldiers alleg-
edly raided most of the village homes and gang 
raped between 23 and 100 women.232
In court documents, women from KunanPosh-
pora narrated the incidents of sexualized violence 
in graphic detail.  They described groups of up to 
eight soldiers raping girls and women ranging in 
ages from eight years old to 70 years old.233  The 
soldiers also allegedly gang raped a woman who 
gave birth four days after the attack.234  Most of 
the women reported that the soldiers smelled 
of alcohol or were drinking alcohol while they 
gagged and bound their victims before gang raping 
them.235
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After forcing villagers to sign No Objection Cer-
tificates,236 the soldiers left KunanPoshpora at 
approximately 9:00 a.m. the morning of February 
24, 1991.
investigation
“ In Kashmir, despite an entire village of eye-witnesses, torn and bloodied clothes, and discarded liquor bottles, the investigat-
ing officer closed the investigation “for want 
of evidence.”
On February 27, 1991, villagers reported the attack 
to army official headquarters located approxi-
mately five kilometers from KunanPoshpora.237 
According to army officials, the villagers stated 
that “women had been molested at Kunan on the 
night of the search[,]” but the villagers stated that 
they did not know the victims or any of the victims’ 
names and no one filed a complaint.238  Village 
leaders reported that in response to their serious 
accusations, army officials “denied the charges and 
took no further action.”239  
On March 4, 1991, villagers of KunanPoshpora 
sent a letter to the District Magistrate/Deputy 
Commissioner S.M. Yasin that described the 
incident.240  Yasin visited KunanPoshpora the fol-
lowing day241 with police officers from Trehgam, 
including two constables who allegedly had 
accompanied the army into the villages on the 
night of the search.242  Yasin interviewed twenty-
three women in KunanPoshpora against whom 
“atrocities ha[d] been committed.”243  He also “was 
shown the rooms which were used for gang-raping 
and was shown the clothes which were torn by 
the Army . . . .”244  His report recommended that 
the government investigate and prosecute those 
responsible, and that “measures be taken to prevent 
any more such unfortunate incident[s] in the 
district.”245  Yasin sent the report to the head of the 
Kashmir civil authority, Divisional Commissioner 
Wajahat Habibullah and to the Superintendent of 
Police in Kupwara.246  Fifteen days after filing his 
report, Yasin was transferred from his post.247
On March 18, almost three weeks after the village 
raid, the Trehgam Police Station registered a 
First Incident Report (FIR).248  The FIR alleged 
the crimes of rape, trespass with the intention of 
assault, and wrongful confinement.249  
Between March 15 and 21, 1991, medical officers 
examined thirty-two women and found evidence 
of rape, including healing abrasions and contu-
sions.250  The medical reports also stated that, four 
days after allegedly being kicked in the stomach by 
a soldier, a woman gave birth to a baby with a frac-
tured arm.251 
The highest-ranking police officer in Trehgam 
concluded that “[a]s per medical examination 
report, offense . . . [of rape] stands prima facie 
proved and made out.”252  On March 22, 1991, the 
Director General of Police, the highest-ranking 
police officer in J&K, reassigned the investigation 
to a Kupwara police official, Assistant Superin-
tendent Dilbagh Singh.253  Singh worked with a 
Special Investigation Team (SIT) to interview wit-
nesses, victims, and army officials.254  The SIT also 
gathered physical evidence, including the victims’ 
clothes, and compiled a list of 125 soldiers that par-
ticipated in the village attack.255  In July, Singh was 
transferred from Kupwara.256  The police investi-
gation was reassigned in July to a Senior Superin-
tendent of Police (SSP), who “started afresh” the 
investigation.257
A fact-finding delegation led by Chief Justice of the 
High Court of J&K in March 1991 interviewed 
fifty-three rape victims.258   The delegation’s report 
expressed concern that local officials had failed to 
follow “normal investigative procedures.”259 
Intense coverage of the attack by the national and 
international press elicited “strong denials from 
army officials.”260  On March 18, 1991, Divisional 
Commissioner Habibullah also visited Kunan-
Poshpora.261  Following his visit, Habibullah 
concluded in his report that “[i]t is impossible to 
believe that officers of a Force such as the Indian 
Army would lead their men into a village with 
access to justice for women
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the sole aim of violating its women.”262  Finding 
the allegations of mass rape “highly doubtful,” he 
argued that “[i]f in each case rape was committed 
by 5 to 15 persons as alleged there would have had 
to have been at least 300 men in the village doing 
nothing but this!”263  He reasoned that the villag-
ers may “have acted under militant pressure” and 
“[t]hat elements wishing to discredit the army as 
brutal, the civilian administration as ineffective 
and the Govt of India as uncaring ha[d] orches-
trated a campaign . . . .”264 
“ In March 2013, twenty-two years after the village attack, the police filed a closure report—a document police submit 
when the investigation does not uncover suf-
ficient evidence of a crime— in Kupwara 
District Court for judicial evaluation.  The 
High Court subsequently denied a Public 
Interest Litigation (PIL) petition to investi-
gate the military’s crimes . . .
At the request of the Indian army, the Press 
Council of India appointed a committee to investi-
gate the incident.265  In June of 1991, Council 
members interviewed alleged victims and hospital 
officials.266  The Council concluded that abrasions 
described by the medical reports were “common 
among village folk in Kashmir” and “such a delayed 
medical examination prove[d] nothing.”267  The 
Council also noted that the baby’s broken arm may 
have been caused by doctors’ efforts “to position the 
foetus [sic] correctly or otherwise to ease the 
delivery.”268  The Council determined that the 
evidence “simply d[id] not add up [] [and] [wa]s 
riddled with contradictions of the most elemen-
tary kind.”269  “In the absence of any credible 
evidence,” the Council reasoned that the allega-
tions “appear[ed] to be an invention, a hurriedly 
contrived piece of dissimulation which finally 
broke down under the weight of its own contradic-
tions . . . . [The story was] a carefully rehearsed 
piece of disinformation that was made and 
marketed to arouse anger and hatred . . . .”270
In September of 1991, the police forwarded the 
criminal investigation to the Director Prosecution 
(DP), located in the office of the Director General 
of Police.271  The DP concluded that the “challenge 
[wa]s not maintainable,”272 and the allegations 
were “unfit for launching criminal prosecution.”273 
He enumerated four “defects” with the accusations: 
(1) “[t]he statements of witnesses [were] not only 
stereotyped but also suffer[ed] from serious dis-
crepancies and contradictions”; (2) the crime was 
not immediately reported to the police; (3) the 
District Magistrate did not receive the initial com-
plaint from villagers until March 4, “which could 
give rise to the legal presumption that the incident 
ha[d] been stage managed”; and (4) “[t]he inabil-
ity of the witnesses to identify the alleged accused 
ha[d] introduced a fatal and incurable lacuna in 
the prosecution story.”274  
On September 12, 1991, the police closed the 
investigation as “untraced” without filing the 
required “closure report” to the District Magis-
trate.275  The Code of Criminal Procedure requires 
a police officer closing an investigation to submit 
a report to the court.276  No further investigations 
were conducted despite repeated attempts by the 
alleged victims to file complaints.277
Between 2004 and 2011, thirty-nine alleged 
victims submitted individual and group peti-
tions to the State Human Rights Commission 
(SHRC).278  The SHRC consolidated the com-
plaints and issued a report in October of 2011.279 
The report concluded that army officials had 
“turned into beasts,” consumed alcohol, and “gagged 
the mouths of the victims and committed forced 
gang-rape . . . .”280  The SHRC recommended that 
the J&K government prosecute officers allegedly 
responsible for the cover up, reopen the investiga-
tion, and compensate all of the victims named in 
the various petitions.281  At the time of the publi-
cation of this Report, the Indian government had 
yet to inform, as required by law, the SHRC of the 
efforts to comply with its recommendations.282 
In March 2013, twenty-two years after the 
village attack, the police filed a closure report—a 
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document police submit when the investigation 
does not uncover sufficient evidence of a crime— 
in Kupwara District Court for judicial evalua-
tion.283  The High Court subsequently denied a 
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) petition to inves-
tigate the military’s crimes, ruling that the litiga-
tion would be “premature” due to the filing of the 
closure report.284  Two survivors filed a protest 
petition in response and requested that the court 
reopen the investigation.285  
“ The criminal courts of Kashmir never prosecuted or punished any of the alleged per-petrators of the mass rapes and police filed 
an official closure report with the court in 
2013—twenty-two years after the attacks.
On June 18, 2013, the Kupwara District Court 
rejected the closure report and found that the cir-
cumstances of the allegations “ma[de] an unbreak-
able chain to put the suspects on trial.”286  The 
court criticized the Director Prosecution’s 1991 
findings, the failure of investigating agency to 
“unveil[] the identity of the culprits despite having 
a clear cut nominal role of 125 suspects[,]” and 
ordered the police to hold an “investigation parade” 
to determine the identities of the accused.287  The 
court also ordered the police to conduct an investi-
gation within three months.288  
In November of 2013, after the District Court’s 
deadline expired, the army appealed the court’s 
order to the J&K Sessions Court.  The army appeal 
argued that an “identification parade” was too diffi-
cult to organize so many years after the incident.289 
The appeal denied the allegations of rape and 
torture, asserted the goal of “total [immunity] for 
the alleged perpetrators[,]” and stated that army 
would not cooperate with the investigations but 
make  “every effort . . . to stall them.”290  In response, 
the Sessions Court criticized the army for their 
“non-seriousness” and “casual irresponsible 
manner” before the dismissing the army’s appeal 
and ordering an investigation of the crimes.291  
On January 15, 2015, the J&K High Court stayed 
both the District Court order to reopen the inves-
tigation and the Sessions Court order to continue 
the investigation.292  An appeal of the High Court’s 
stay is pending before the Supreme Court of India. 
In March 2015, the Supreme Court of India also 
stayed the compensation order for the victims 
issued by the J&K High Court. As of the time of 
this Report, the government has not investigated, 
charged, or prosecuted those responsible for the 
acts of sexual violence.293  
Gujarat
context
Gujarat has a long history of communal violence. 
Since 1947, Hindu and Muslim communities 
living in the western State of Gujarat have expe-
rienced political, economic, and religious tensions 
which periodically flare into social upheaval and 
violence.294  In the 1960s, a housing shortage in 
Gujarat’s capital city exacerbated the tensions; 
the shortage was generated by population growth, 
struggles over public resources, and job losses in 
the textile industry.295  In September 1969, the 
first major Gujarat riot resulted in more than 660 
dead, 1,000 injured, and widespread destruction to 
property when Hindu crowds attacked Muslims 
and Muslim-owned property.296  In 1985, protests 
against a state policy to allocate government jobs to 
underrepresented communities297 became violent 
and resulted in hundreds of dead and injured.298 
An official inquiry concluded that the police had 
failed to respond effectively, and in fact had par-
ticipated in the violence.299  Major riots in 1990 
and 1992 coincided with incidents of communal 
violence throughout India.300   
By the early 2000s, many members of Hindu 
and Muslim communities in Ahmedabad, Guja-
rat’s largest city, lived segregated lives.301  Many 
members of the Muslim community, which com-
prised twelve percent of the city’s population in 
2001, lived in neighborhoods located in the out-
skirts of the city.302  Juhapura, Ahmedabad’s largest 
Muslim neighborhood, currently of 400,000 
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inhabitants, lacks basic services including access to 
clean water, sanitation, and education.303  Muslims 
were underrepresented in government, including 
the judiciary, and business.304 
“ In Gujarat, public officials and police officers reportedly seized control of police control rooms on the day of the massacre, 
facilitated the mob’s access to the commu-
nity, prevented Muslims from fleeing mob 
violence, and failed to respond to calls for 
assistance from Muslim victims.  
In 2001, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) came to power in Gujarat.305  The 
Hindu nationalist movement advocates for the 
establishment of a Hindu state in India and 
contends that minority religious communities, 
including Muslims, are “foreigners” and a threat to 
the security of the Hindu majority.306  On February 
27, 2002, a Muslim mob allegedly set fire to two 
train cars travelling in eastern Gujarat carrying 
Hindu pilgrims.307  In total, 59 Hindu passengers, 
including 10 children and 27 women, died in the 
incident.308  In the days following, government offi-
cials and local media described Muslims as “terror-
ists.”309 For three days after the train fire, Hindu 
nationalists attacked Muslims in Gujarat.310  While 
some claimed that the violence was a spontaneous 
reaction to the killings of Hindu pilgrims, an 
Indian court determined that members of the 
Hindu nationalist parties planned the violence.311 
incident
On February 28, 2002, at approximately 8:00 
a.m., about 5,000 to 10,000 armed individu-
als carrying spears, swords, tridents, gas cylin-
ders, petrol bombs, and acid bombs attacked the 
Muslim community of Naroda Patiya.312  Located 
in eastern Ahmedabad, Naroda Patiya was a 
community of nearly one thousand low-income 
Muslim families.313  Attackers, led by members of 
the BJP and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), 
another Hindu nationalist organization, shouted 
“Jai Sri Ram” [long live Lord Ram], “Not a single 
Miya [Muslim] should be able to survive,” and 
“Slaughter, Cut.”314  Some perpetrators used tri-
shuls—a three-pronged metal trident of religious 
significance to many Hindus—and wore saffron 
scarves and khaki shorts—the uniform of Hindu 
nationalist groups.315 
The attack on the neighborhood lasted until 10:00 
p.m.316 A court judgment found that “[members of 
the mob] were shattering the property of Muslims 
into pieces; they were ransacking the property of 
Muslims by getting into their homes; they were 
outraging the modesty of Muslim women; they 
were torching even women, children and cripples, 
burning them alive.”317  According to officials, 96 
persons were killed, including 25 children and 35 
women, and 125 persons were injured.318 
Egregious crimes of sexual violence were commit-
ted during the attack on Naroda Patiya.  Hindu 
rioters raped, gang raped, inserted foreign objects 
into, and stripped victims.319   According to wit-
nesses, most of the female victims—girls and 
women—were raped before they were murdered 
and burned.320  Several victims observed an 
attacker slice open the womb of a pregnant Muslim 
woman with a sword, extract her fetus, and subse-
quently throw both the woman and her fetus into 
a nearby fire; the woman was at or near full-term in 
her pregnancy.321  Another witness described how 
a perpetrator sliced a young girl’s vagina open and 
threw her onto a fire.322  Witnesses also observed 
the rape of girls as young as 12 years old.323  
Muslim women were killed by sword or burned 
alive in front of their families and alongside 
their children.324  One witness reported that his 
daughter was dragged away, raped by four to five 
men, and beaten.325  She later died at a hospital.326 
The witness’ wife and two other daughters were 
also dragged away and burned alive.327  Members 
of fleeing Muslim families were detained, stripped, 
raped, and then murdered.328  One woman recalled 
seeing “a naked girl running from twenty-five 
men.”329  Another survivor testified that four men 
cut off the string of her petticoat, sliced her hand 
with a sword, and gang raped her.330 
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Victims and eyewitnesses stated that police officers 
were complicit in the sexual crimes against women 
both during and after the incident.331  Accord-
ing to human rights reports, Muslim requests for 
help went unheeded.332  For example, one victim 
recalled: “The police was on the spot but helping 
the mob.  We fell in their feet but they said they 
were ordered from above (not to help).  Since the 
telephone wires were snapped we could not inform 
the fire brigade.”333  The local police station did 
not erect a barrier to block entry into the Muslim 
area334 or deploy Mahila [women] Police.335 
Some police officers also actively participated in 
the violence.  For example, witnesses reported that 
police officers led the mob to Muslim homes and 
fired on Muslims.336  One perpetrator testified that 
“[t]here were 50-60 policemen. We were co-oper-
ated by Police.”337
At midnight, when victims of the attack were taken 
to a relief camp under police protection, groups 
attempted to block the vehicles carrying victims.338 
Victims remained in relief camps for months until 
the government of Gujarat ordered the camps 
closed in October 2002.339  Some of the survivors 
never returned to their homes in Naroda Patiya 
and resettled in homes provided by the Islamic 
Relief Committee.340 
investigation
The First Incident Report (FIR) was filed at the 
Naroda Police Station on the night of the massacre. 
From February 28, 2002 to March 8, 2002, the 
First Investigation Officer (IO) of Naroda Police 
Station led the criminal investigation.341  The 
IO is authorized to record statements from wit-
nesses, collect evidence, and arrest suspects.342  The 
First IO did not preserve physical evidence of the 
massacre, including victim remains or weapons, 
nor did he explore investigative leads, such as the 
source of the agent used to burn the victims, or 
arrest the perpetrators identified by witnesses and 
victims.343  Survivors and witnesses criticized the 
IO for his ill-treatment of Muslims, insensitivity 
towards victims, and refusal to take statements 
from witnesses.344
On March 8, 2002, the Assistant Police Commis-
sioner of Gujarat took over the investigation.345 
While he recorded statements from a few of the 
injured parties at the hospital, he did not arrest any 
of the accused named in the FIRs.346  The inves-
tigator interviewed Hindus, but did not visit the 
victims’ relief camps.347  The Special Court con-
cluded: “he was too careless to even know that the 
complainants and victims were Muslims.”348
In May 2002, the investigation was transferred 
to the Crime Branch in Ahmedabad where it 
remained until April 2008.349  According to a court 
ruling, the investigators within the Crime Branch 
often refused to record the names of perpetrators 
provided by witnesses.350  A witness alleged that 
the investigators only asked for the names and 
addresses of witnesses and completed the remain-
der of the witness statements according to their 
“whim and will.”351
The National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC), National Commission for Women 
(NCW), and the National Commission for Minor-
ities criticized the police investigation and police 
operations.352  According to the final judgment 
in the case, “the entire police record of statements 
[wa]s suspect and unreliable.”353  One attorney at 
the NHRC noted:
When witnesses file complaints, the police enter 
their statements according to their [own] prefer-
ence.  They don’t file complaints properly.  People 
are uneducated and the police don’t show them 
the statement, they just get them to sign it . . . .  
In some cases, [the police] won’t write the name 
of the accused.  In one case, for example, seven 
people were identified but they didn’t write their 
names.354
The NCW criticized the way police in Gujarat reg-
istered details of violence against women.355   The 
chair of the Commission stated that “the number 
of FIRs registered was much less than the inci-
dents of violence against women reported to the 
NCW.”356  Police officers disregarded eyewitness 
accounts and ended the criminal investigations of 
thousands of rioters for lack of evidence.357 
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“ Police merged the 120 reports filed by victims of sexual violence into 26 official complaints two to three months following the 
massacre.  These “omnibus” FIRs did not 
identify individual perpetrators but attrib-
uted the violence to anonymous “mobs”.
During the investigation, there is evidence that 
police mistreated and re-traumatized victims of 
sexual violence.  According to the Special Court, 
“the psychological aspect and the result of such 
crimes which . . . traumatiz[ed] victims is [a] very 
important factor.  It is clear that none of the 
previous investigators has taken any care for the 
victims of the crime[s] all of which was necessary 
for effective investigation of [the] crime[s] to 
unearth the modus, the preparation, the conspir-
acy, the perpetrators, etc.”358  Moreover, investigat-
ing officers did not follow-up with witnesses to 
obtain accurate, detailed information.359 
Police merged the 120 reports filed by victims of 
sexual violence into 26 official complaints two to 
three months following the massacre.360  These 
“omnibus” FIRs did not identify individual perpe-
trators but attributed the violence to anonymous 
“mobs.”361  Without information about the identity 
of the perpetrators of sexual violence, the prosecu-
tor was unable bring charges of rape and the court 
was unable to determine criminal liability for the 
crimes.362  One victim reported: “I am not a ‘mob,’ 
I am a woman who was gang-raped by three men. 
How can I hope for justice when they don’t even 
register my complaint properly?”363
trial
A stay by the Supreme Court from 2003 to 2008 
delayed the beginning of trial.364 In 2008, the 
Supreme Court ordered a reinvestigation of the 
case in response to petitions filed by the National 
Human Rights Commission and NGO Citizens 
for Justice and Peace.365  The Supreme Court 
appointed a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to 
conduct the new investigation.366 
In 2009, the Supreme Court constituted a fast-
track court, a special prosecutor was appointed,367 
and charges were filed against 62 accused, including 
prominent figures within the BJP and VHP.368  Of 
the 62 accused, 57 had been arrested and released 
on bail between 2002 and 2009.369  Some of the 
accused released on bail threatened witnesses and 
pressured victims to withdraw their cases.370 
During the trial, 327 witnesses testified,371 includ-
ing 25 women and 42 doctors.372  Trial records 
reveal that the doctors who examined women after 
the attack did not testify about the evidence of 
sexual violence.373    
“ In 2012, approximately three years after the trial began and ten years after the attack on Naroda Patiya, an Indian court 
rendered the only judgment in the case. 
In 2012, approximately three years after the trial 
began and ten years after the attack on Naroda 
Patiya, an Indian court rendered the only judgment 
in the case.  The Special Court Judge convicted 32 
defendants of murder, attempted murder, conspir-
acy, spreading enmity and communal hatred, and 
unlawful assembly, and acquitted 29 defendants.374 
A former government cabinet member and a leader 
of the redacted were among those found guilty.375
Although nine of the 62 defendants were charged 
with crimes of sexual violence, including rape, 
“assault or criminal force to woman with intent to 
outrage her modesty,” and an “act done with inten-
tion of preventing child from being born alive,”376 
only one of the accused was convicted.377 The 
Special Court Judge concluded that, while acts of 
sexual assault, rape, and gang rape did in fact occur, 
the prosecution did not successfully make the case 
against the identified individuals.378  The one con-
viction was based on a confession by a defendant 
who raped a 16-year-old Muslim girl and killed her 
by throwing her from a roof.379  
The trial judge found another victim was gang 
raped but concluded that the government had not 
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proven the guilt of any of the accused.380  The trial 
judge ordered the government to compensate the 
gang rape victim in the amount of INR 500,000 
(USD 8,267).381  The victim did not receive the 
compensation until months later, following several 
visits from the victim’s lawyers to the state Social 
Welfare Department and an additional court 
order.382  Allegations of police participation and 
complicity were not investigated and the govern-
ment of Gujarat did not initiate disciplinary pro-
ceedings against police officers or public officials 
involved in the Naroda Patiya massacre. 
Odisha
context
One of the poorest states in India, Odisha has been 
a site of Hindu-Christian tension for decades.383 
Since the 1860s, marginalized groups in the 
region, including Dalits (oppressed castes includ-
ing so-called “untouchables”) and Adivasis (indig-
enous tribes),384 have converted to Christianity to 
gain access to education, healthcare, and employ-
ment.385  Hindu nationalist groups view conver-
sions to Christianity as a threat to the security and 
the future of a Hindu India.386  When the rate of 
conversions rose in the 1960s, Hindu nationalists 
forced Dalit Christians and Adivasi Christians 
to convert to Hinduism.387  The government of 
Odisha outlawed the practice of forced conver-
sions in 1967.388  
The most recent wave of violence by Hindu nation-
alists against Christians in Odisha began in 1986 
when nationalists reportedly set fire to sixteen 
churches.389  Since the mid-1990s, Hindu nation-
alist groups strengthened and mobilized cultural, 
political, militia organizations in the state.390  In 
late 2007, Hindu mobs destroyed dozens of Chris-
tian churches and hundreds of Christian homes.391 
Although the police were warned about the attacks, 
no measures were taken to prevent them392 and 
nationalist organizers were able to block roadways 
and sever power and phone lines in preparation for 
the violence.393  
By 2008, Hindu nationalist organizations were 
active in 25 of 30 districts in Odisha.394  On 
August 23, 2008, a prominent Hindu national-
ist and religious leader and four of his disciples 
were assassinated in the district of Kandhamal.395 
Some state officials claimed the attackers were 
Maoist insurgents.396  Various Hindu nationalist 
groups accused the local Christian community of 
carrying out the attack.397  Between August and 
October 2008, Hindu nationalists forced Chris-
tians out of 450 villages, burned 4,901 homes, and 
injured 18,000 people, displacing 53,000 individu-
als, many of whom sought shelter in nearby forests 
and makeshift relief camps.  Approximately 54 to 
86 persons were killed.398
incident
According to court records, on August 24, 2008, 
fleeing from Hindu mobs, redacted, redacted, 
and redacted left their residence at a Christian-
run pastoral center to seek safety in the home of 
redacted.399  On August 25, 2008, an armed mob 
of 40 to 50 people entered the private home and 
forcibly removed redact and redacted.400  After 
dragging redact from the residence by her hair, 
the mob brought the pair to a Catholic-redacted 
organization that mobs had ransacked and burned 
the previous day.401  There, men removed redact’s 
clothes including her underwear while pushing 
her onto the veranda.402  When redacted begged 
the mob not to hurt redact, he was dragged away, 
doused with kerosene, and forced to kneel on the 
road.403  Men stood on redact’s hands while she 
was raped by redacted.404  Observers clapped while 
redact was raped.405
After the rape, the mob took redact to the road 
where the redact was kneeling.406  Members of the 
police watched while the mob paraded half-naked 
redact and redacted through the village and physi-
cally and verbally abused them.407  redacted later 
stated that, during this ordeal, “he saw police per-
sonnel and prayed for help, but they paid a deaf 
ear to him.”408  In a later account of her attack to 
newspapers, redact stated that “State Police failed 
to stop the crimes, failed to protect me from the 
attackers, [rather,] they were friendly with the 
attackers.”409  The mob later left redact and redact 
at a police outpost.410 
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investigation 
Redact reported that the police at the village 
police outpost were “very insensitive towards [the 
victims].”411  A doctor provided medical treat-
ment to both redact and redacted before they were 
escorted to the redacted police station that same 
night.412  When  redact arrived at the redacted 
police station, she disclosed to the investigating 
officer that she had been raped.413  The inves-
tigating officer asked redact whether she knew 
“the meaning of rape and the consequences she 
[would] face for lodging a complaint.”414  A female 
Special Investigator took redact to a closed room 
to question her about the attack and reported 
redact‘s account of her rape back to the investi-
gating officers.415  The female Special Investigator 
then accompanied redact to the redact hospital for 
a medical examination.416  
At the hospital, two female doctors examined the 
victim by using the “two-finger test” and concluded: 
“the vaginal canal admitted two fingers loose and 
[was] severely tender.”417  The medical examina-
tion report filed by the doctors documented abra-
sions and scratches on redact’s chest, a swollen left 
eye, and bruises on her cheek, neck, and back.418 
According to the report, redact’s injuries indicated 
that she was “raped over a cemented floor without 
clothing on her back.”419 
The next morning on August 26, 2008, both 
redact and redact were taken to redact police 
station where they lodged a written First Infor-
mation Report (FIR).420  While the FIR included 
the allegation of rape, the police officers ordered 
redact not to write the details of the incident in 
her official complaint and advised her not to press 
charges.421  According to redact, “They tried their 
best to keep me from registering a formal investi-
gation request.”422  redact filed a second FIR about 
his ordeal, however, his FIR did not include details 
about redact’s rape or the suspects’ identities.423 
Later that day, the police put redact and 
redactChredact on a public bus from redact toward 
Bhubaneswar, the capital of Odisha.424  The police 
escorted the bus for the approximately five-hour 
journey.425  Without police protection, redact then 
transferred to a bus from Bhubaneswar to New 
Delhi and travelled from place to place in search of 
shelter and protection.426
“ in Odisha the police did not prevent a mob from parading the injured, half-naked victim through the village by detaining and 
arresting individuals engaged in criminal 
conduct.  
The police visited the site where redact was raped 
for the first time a week after the incident.427 The 
judgment later determined that the evidence col-
lected there by the Scientific Officer had “no evi-
dentiary value.”428  Although the female Special 
Investigator requested a copy of the medical report 
on several occasions, the hospital did not release 
the report to the police until October 1, 2008, 
more than a month after the incident.429 
The case was subsequently transferred to the 
Inspector of Police at the Crime Branch of 
Odisha.430  Almost five months after the incident, 
on January 5, 2009, the Crime Branch arranged the 
first Test Identification Parade (TIP) for redact 
and redact to identify their attackers.431  Over the 
course of three TIPs, redact identified Santosh 
Patnaik as the person who raped her and redact, 
Gajendra Digal, and Saroj Badhei as persons who 
were present when she was raped.432  Charges were 
filed against ten persons for gang rape, assault, or 
criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage 
her modesty; assault or criminal force with intent 
to dishonor a person; rioting, armed with a deadly 
weapon; criminal intimidation; unlawful assembly; 
and obscene acts and songs.433  All of the accused 
resided in redact knew redact and redact person-
ally, and denied the charges.434
Once Santosh Patnaik had been identified as a 
suspect, a Medical Officer conducted a medical 
examination.  The report determined that Santosh 
Patnaik was capable of sexual intercourse.435 
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trial
On March 24, 2009, the trial began in a fast track 
Judicial Magistrate court in redact.436  Feeling 
unsafe in redact, redact requested that redact court 
transfer the case to redact,437 roughly 180 miles 
east and the second-largest city in Odisha, but the 
district court denied her request.438  The Odisha 
High Court intervened to transfer the case to a 
redact court.439 
At trial, the accused pled not guilty.440  The suspects’ 
defense lawyers reportedly characterized the rape 
as an act of retaliation for the death of a promi-
nent Hindu nationalist and religious leader, which 
occurred a few days prior to the attack on redact.441 
During the trial, a BJP spokesman criticized the 
local archbishop for using the story of redact’s rape 
as a means of rallying Christians against Hindus.442
Twenty-nine witnesses testified at trial.443  During 
cross-examination, most witnesses admitted that 
while they saw redact and redact redact paraded 
half-naked redact through the streets, they had not 
witnessed the rape.444 
One of the female doctors who had examined 
redact testified during trial and detailed redact’s 
injuries as described in the medical examination 
report.445  The doctor concluded in her testimony 
that the findings of the medical report were “con-
sistent with recent signs and symptoms of forceful 
attempted sexual intercourse.”446 
When redact testified, the defense argued that 
redact’s failure to mention redact’s rape in the FIR 
was evidence that the rape had not occurred.447 
The court noted that redactredact had not iden-
tified a single assailant during the TIPs.448  The 
court concluded however that redact’s testimony 
that Santosh Patnaik, Gajendra Digal, and three 
others not facing trial were at the scene of the rape 
“inspires confidence.”449 
The court concluded that redact’s religious affili-
ations called into question the credibility of her 
testimony, noting that “she was being financially 
and morally supported by the Christian organiza-
tion.”450  As evidence of her bias, the court referred 
to her participation in a conference organized by 
Christian bishops after the attack, the presence of 
her advocates during the TIP, and her failure to 
disclose “how the journey expenses were met by 
her.”451  The court also questioned the credibility 
of redact’s testimony because she did not give a 
description of her assailants in her FIR, although 
she had stated that the police had told her to keep 
her FIR short and “did not take down [her] state-
ment as [she] narrated in detail.”452  In speaking to 
the press about her negative interactions with the 
police, redact stated, “I was raped and now I don’t 
want to be victimized by the Odisha police.”453 
“ The suspects’ defense lawyers report-edly characterized the rape as an act of retal-iation for the death of a prominent Hindu 
nationalist and religious leader, which 
occurred a few days prior to the attack on 
redact.  During the trial, a BJP spokesman 
criticized the local archbishop for using the 
story of redact’s rape as a means of rallying 
Christians against Hindus.
The court issued its final judgment on March 14, 
2014, five years after trial began.454  The court 
found three of the ten men initially listed on the 
charge sheet guilty of several offenses.  Santosh 
Patnaik was convicted of gang rape and, in addition 
to Gajendra Digal and Saroj Badhei, was found 
guilty of assault or criminal force to a woman with 
intent to outrage her modesty; assault or criminal 
force with intent to dishonor a person, otherwise 
than on grave provocation; rioting, armed with a 
deadly weapon; criminal intimidation; and obscene 
acts and songs.455  Six defendants were fully acquit-
ted due to lack of evidence, while another man fled 
before trial and was never arrested or 
prosecuted.456 
Three of those convicted were sentenced to 
“rigorous imprisonment” for 26 months, while 
Santosh Patnaik received an additional sentence 
of 11 years and a fine of Rs. 10,000 (USD 159) 
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for gang rape to be paid directly to redact.457  If he 
could not pay the fine, the court authorized that 
the fine be converted into an additional six-month 
jail sentence.458  Allegations of police complicity 
were not investigated.
Discussion
Sexual violence is a form of gender discrimination 
prohibited by international law “at all times, in all 
places.”459  Under certain circumstances, rape may 
constitute torture, a crime against humanity, or a 
war crime.460  States use due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, punish, and provide redress for acts 
of sexual violence against women, regardless of 
whether the acts were committed by state or 
private actors.461  This section highlights some of 
the key ways India has failed to provide justice to 
victims of sexual violence and examines the struc-
tural and institutional weaknesses in the domestic 
justice system revealed by this analysis.
“ Laws based on modesty or feminine chastity focus on the victim’s status rather than prohibit acts of violence against women.
The crimes described by the Report occurred in a 
context of impunity.  International human rights 
bodies have held that impunity “fosters chronic 
repetition of human rights violations and total 
defenselessness of victims and their relatives.”462 
When viewed as a whole, the case examples 
described by this Report reveal patterns and 
common shortcomings of India’s legal system that 
contribute to legal impunity.  
Organized according to the different stages of 
India’s response to acts of sexual violence, this 
section discusses the following nine dimensions of 
the Indian legal system: criminalization, preven-
tion, contextual analysis, reporting, registration 
of complaints and arrests, collection of evidence, 
timeliness, legal immunity, and redress.  For each 
dimension, this section draws on the case examples 
to identify legal and institutional obstacles to effec-
tive criminal investigations, prosecutions, and 
reparations of gender-based crimes.  The section 
also employs international human rights, humani-
tarian, and criminal standards to guide the analysis 
of access to redress for victims of sexual violence 
in two ways: (i) to diagnose common and central 
weaknesses of India’s legal system and (ii) to 
identify reforms to respond to those deficiencies.
Criminalization of Sexual Violence
At the time of the incidents described in this 
Report, the Indian Penal Code criminalized rape 
as penile-vaginal penetration defined by lack of 
consent.463  Non-vaginal penetration or penetra-
tion with an object or finger did not constitute 
rape464 but instead an “unnatural offence”465 or an 
“assault or criminal force to woman with intent to 
outrage her modesty.”466  
As a result of this narrow definition of rape, many 
of the acts of sexual violence described in this 
Report did not constitute a crime, or constituted 
a crime against the victim’s modesty under Indian 
law, rather than a serious crime of violence.  For 
example, the stripping of redact in Odisha and the 
acts of sodomy and penetration with objects in 
Gujarat and Kashmir were charged as “unnatural 
offenses” or “criminal force with intent to outrage 
[the victim’s] modesty” under Indian law.467 
International law defines rape in terms of coercion 
rather than the absence of consent and defines 
sexual violence as a violation of bodily integrity 
rather than a violation of feminine modesty.468 
Laws based on modesty or feminine chastity focus 
on the victim’s status rather than prohibit acts of 
violence against women.469 By institutionalizing 
“existing beliefs and practices linked to chastity” 
and morality, Indian criminal justice system fails 
to provide adequate protection against sexual 
violence,470 to acknowledge “all forms of violence 
against women[,]” or to address “the root and 
structural causes of violence against women.”471 
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“ [T]he ICTR determined that “coercion may be inherent in armed conflict situations or when military personnel . . . are 
present.”
Broader definitions of rape and sexual violence 
ensure the criminalization of a range of unaccept-
able conduct.472  For example, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has 
defined rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual 
nature, committed on a person under circum-
stances which are coercive” and sexual violence 
more broadly as “any act of a sexual nature which is 
committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive,” including non-physical acts, such as 
forced nudity.473  Coercion need not amount to 
physical force, but rather “[t]hreats, intimida-
tion . . . [and] forms of duress which prey on fear 
or desperation may constitut[e] coercion.”474 
Indeed, the ICTR determined that “coercion may 
be inherent in armed conflict situations or when 
military personnel . . . are present.”475  Standards 
using coercion rather than consent also provide 
evidentiary advantages to victims by shifting the 
focus of investigation from whether the victim 
provided consent to the perpetrator’s use of 
force.476  Further, recognition of inherent coercion 
in armed conflict situations may encourage victims 
to report rape by armed men or act as a 
deterrent.477 
Prevention
Despite warnings of impending attacks in Gujarat 
and Odisha, public officials and police did not 
act to protect minority communities.  Instead, 
state actors participated in or tolerated the acts 
of violence.  In Gujarat, public officials and police 
officers reportedly seized control of police control 
rooms on the day of the massacre,478 facilitated the 
mob’s access to the community, prevented Muslims 
from fleeing mob violence,479 and failed to respond 
to calls for assistance from Muslim victims.480 
Prominent figures of the Hindu nationalist 
political party were convicted of “conspiracy” and 
“spreading enmity and communal hatred,” although 
the role of police officials was not investigated or 
prosecuted.481  Similarly, in Odisha the police did 
not prevent a mob from parading the injured, half-
naked victim through the village by detaining and 
arresting individuals engaged in criminal conduct.  
Rather than fulfilling the duty to prevent violence 
by protecting civilian populations, state security 
forces employed their power to facilitate acts of 
sexual violence.  The court found that the police 
in Punjab used their authority to detain and bru-
talize a woman in state custody.  In Kashmir, 
the Indian government granted members of the 
military the legal authority to enter civilian homes 
without warrant and use force “even to the causing 
of death,” with legal immunity from prosecution.482 
The authorization to use lethal force and lack of 
accountability contribute to conditions that permit 
sexual violence and impunity.  These legal condi-
tions also pose challenges to domestic and inter-
national law. 
“ “a [S]tate may be liable under inter-national law not only for its officials’ actions but also for its officials’ inaction.” 
Under the Constitution of India, the State must 
provide its citizens with equal protection under 
the law.  State actors are prohibited from discrimi-
nating against persons on the grounds of religion, 
race, caste, or sex.483  The Constitution mandates 
that every person “renounce practices derogatory 
to the dignity of women.”484  The failure to prevent 
the acts of sexual violence described by this Report 
against marginalized, vulnerable, and protected 
classes also may constitute discrimination under 
international law. 
International law obligates States to prevent gen-
der-based crimes against women.485  The SR on 
Violence against Women has explained that the 
scope of international responsibility of States 
extends to acts of omission as well as commission: 
access to justice for women
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“a [S]tate may be liable under international law not 
only for its officials’ actions but also for its officials’ 
inaction.  It is unlawful for the [S]tate: to refrain 
from assistance where assistance is so clearly 
required; to fail to investigate and thereby guar-
antee women’s rights; and, to discriminate in the 
manner in which it enforces human rights (even 
where such discrimination is not intentional).”486 
A State must provide legal protection of the rights 
of women equal to that of men, ensure that public 
authorities and institutions refrain from acts of dis-
crimination against women, and adopt legislative 
and other measures that prohibit gender discrimi-
nation.487 Relevant international law standards 
concerning gender-based violence also encompass 
the State’s duty to prevent violence against women 
and children who are subject to “national, racial, or 
religious hatred.”488  
International human rights bodies have recog-
nized the heightened vulnerability of women 
during armed conflict and mass violence.  The 
CEDAW Committee has determined that situa-
tions of armed conflict lead to increased incidents 
of sexual assault of women and therefore require 
“specific protective . . . measures.”489  According 
to the Committee against Torture, women are at 
particular risk of torture or ill-treatment in situa-
tions of communal violence, and State parties must 
therefore take measures to prevent rape or sexual 
violence and abuse in these circumstances.490  Inter-
national standards highlight that multiple factors 
may contribute to the victims’ vulnerability.  In the 
case examples described in this Report, the victims 
were female, members of religious minorities, and, 
in some cases, living in isolated rural communities 
located in regions impacted by armed conflict and 
therefore were at greater risk for sexual assault and 
rape. During peacetime and in time of conflict, 
international bodies have emphasized the impor-
tance of preventative measures, such as the naming 
and defining of gender-based crimes through the 
passage of legislation, public awareness raising 
campaigns, educational activities, and police train-
ings to prevent that communities are targets of 
violence.491
Contextual Analysis
International due diligence standards require 
States to take into account the context in which 
the acts occurred in adopting measures to respect 
and protect women’s rights.  Attention to the 
complexity of the facts, the context in which they 
occurred, and patterns are critical to determining 
the criminal liability of complex criminal struc-
tures, modus operandi, and the nature and motive 
of certain types of criminal acts.492  A failure to 
analyze context, including systematic patterns sur-
rounding a specific violation of human rights, can 
render any measure of prevention or redress inef-
fective. 
“ One common weakness of the criminal investigations and prosecutions described by this Report is the inattention to context. 
At every stage of the investigation, the case 
records suggest that Indian authorities disre-
garded the socioeconomic, political, cultural, 
and religious context in which the perpetra-
tors committed the acts of violence.
One common weakness of the criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions described by this Report is 
the inattention to context.  At every stage of the 
investigation, the case records suggest that Indian 
authorities disregarded the socioeconomic, politi-
cal, cultural, and religious context in which the per-
petrators committed the acts of violence. 
Investigators and court officials ignored that 
redact’s detention occurred at a time when police 
routinely harassed, tortured, and/or detained Sikh 
women, including those suspected of having infor-
mation about male relatives involved in Sikh sepa-
ratist groups;493 that Hindu nationalist leaders 
specifically targeted Muslim women during the 
Gujarat violence;494 that Kashmir is “one of the 
world’s most militarized areas” and the military has 
broad legal authority to use lethal force; and that 
Hindu nationalists had attacked Christians in 
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Odisha and injured tens of thousands at the time 
of the incident.  The disregard for context under-
mined investigators’ efforts to identify perpetrators 
of sexual violence, prosecutors’ mandate to bring 
charges related to the incidents of sexual violence, 
and the courts’ authority to convict perpetrators of 
sexual violence. 
Although investigators disregarded context in 
their efforts to identify motive and individualize 
perpetrators, the victim’s gender, ethnicity, religion, 
and economic status appear to have heavily influ-
enced the way the investigation and prosecution 
unfolded. In Odisha, police officials attempted 
to prevent the Christian victim from incorporat-
ing the details of her rape by a Hindu mob in her 
First Information Report.  In Gujarat, investiga-
tors systematically refused to register complaints 
from Muslim female victims of gender-based 
violence perpetrated by members of a Hindu mob. 
In Punjab, the police officer who raped redact, 
a Sikh woman, alleged in his appeal that redact 
was a terrorist supporter of Sikh separatists and 
had fabricated the rape story while doctors testi-
fied that redact never sought medical care.  And, 
in Kashmir, investigating authorities called the 
allegations of mass rape “a dirty trick to frame the 
Army.”495  Instead, the accountability process often 
re-victimized the women victims.
Reporting 
Incidents of sexualized violence in India are 
grossly underreported.  Indeed, sexual violence 
is one of the most under-reported crimes in 
India.496  According to one recent study, only one 
in ten rapes is reported497 although some claim 
that the figure may be as low as one in 100.498 
Many victims, including those who suffered sexual 
violence during the Naroda Patiya attacks and 
other Gujarat violence, were unable or unwilling to 
report the incidents.  Other victims of the violence 
described by the Report were atypical in that they 
successfully overcame the obstacles to report the 
crimes of sexual violence.  Both types of experi-
ences reveal a variety of difficulties faced by women 
in reporting crimes of sexual violence, such as hos-
tility from police;499 the political and institutional 
influence of the perpetrators;500 and social stigma 
and discrimination.501 
“ Another barrier to reporting lies in the authorities’ participation in or complicity with incidents of sexual violence, as illustrated in 
Punjab, Gujarat, Odisha, and Kashmir.  Rather 
than reporting to a neutral authority, victims 
and witnesses endangered their lives and safety 
by reporting the crimes to officials or institutions 
linked to the crimes.
All the cases described in this Report reveal 
instances where Indian authorities failed to take 
the victims seriously, disregarded their allegations, 
or were insensitive.  Military officials in Kashmir 
disregarded the allegations of atrocities by villagers 
and took no further action.  In Gujarat, investiga-
tors never visited the relief camps where victims 
fled after the violence.  Indeed, they refused to 
register FIRs by Muslim victims.  The court found 
that police officers in Odisha who interviewed the 
victim were “very insensitive” and asked whether 
she knew the meaning of rape.
Another barrier to reporting lies in the authori-
ties’ participation in or complicity with incidents 
of sexual violence, as illustrated in Punjab, Gujarat, 
Odisha, and Kashmir.  Rather than reporting to 
a neutral authority, victims and witnesses endan-
gered their lives and safety by reporting the crimes 
to officials or institutions linked to the crimes.  Vil-
lagers in Kashmir reported the crime to the same 
army officials who were implicated in the attack 
and their allegations were disregarded. Army offi-
cials refused to comply with a 2013 court order to 
conduct a line-up of suspects, asserting that “every 
effort will be made to stall [the investigations].”502 
In Gujarat, victims of the attack filed the FIR at 
the local police station despite alleged participa-
tion by local police. Allegations of police collusion 
have never been investigated.  redact reported the 
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rape to state officials in Punjab despite threats 
by the officers who raped her.  As a consequence, 
local police officers allegedly burned her home and 
tortured several of her relatives and supporters in 
the village.  Although the trial judge acknowledged 
these acts of intimidation and violence, there is 
no evidence that the authorities investigated the 
crimes or provided the victim with protection.
Victims who reported crimes also faced stigma, 
discrimination, and violence. The trial judge in 
Punjab who presided over redact’s case, for example, 
recognized that a woman risked her reputation by 
reporting crimes against “her chastity.”503  Indeed, 
during the lengthy trial and appeal, the defendants 
derided redact’s character and motives for report-
ing the rape.  redact in Odisha requested that her 
case be moved to another city because she did not 
feel safe in Baligunda.  The trial court questioned 
redact’s credibility merely because she was sup-
ported by a Christian organization, and attended 
a Christian conference after the attack.  The Press 
Council of India, which investigated the rapes in 
Kashmir at the behest of the military, disregarded 
physical evidence to conclude that the allegations 
of sexual violence were rehearsed and marketed to 
“arouse anger and hatred.”504 
The victims were mistrustful of the criminal justice 
process and skeptical of its effectiveness.  For those 
who reported crimes of sexual violence, the expe-
rience generated feelings of fear, powerlessness, 
frustration, and insecurity.  During the reporting 
process, it is crucial that investigators avoid revic-
timizing the victim and lay the foundation to pros-
ecute and punish the perpetrators.505  Problems at 
the early stage of the investigation undermine the 
process by hindering efforts to identify, prosecute, 
and punish those responsible for the crimes.
Registration of Complaints and 
Arrest of Suspects
The First Information Report (FIR) is central to 
the Indian criminal justice process.  FIRs often 
initiate the criminal investigation and form the 
basis for charges.  Under Indian law, police officers 
that receive information related to a cognizable 
offense506 have the obligation to file a FIR507 and 
the authority to arrest suspects without a court 
order.508  Sexual crimes, including rape, crimes 
against modesty, and “unnatural offences,” are 
cognizable.509
“ Conflicts exacerbate existing gender inequalities, placing women at heightened risk of various forms of gender-based violence 
by both State and non-state actors.
Investigating authorities refused to file FIRs or 
inadequately or incorrectly recorded information 
provided by witnesses and victims in the case 
studies.  In Odisha, police officers ordered redact 
not to write the details of her rape in the FIR and 
advised her not to press charges.  In Gujarat, police 
officers denied women survivors the right to file 
FIRs or omitted details about rape and murder 
victims in recording the FIRs.  Regarding the 
Gujarat violence, the NCW determined that “[t]he 
number of FIRs registered was much less than the 
incidents of violence against women reported to 
the NCW.”510  When officers did record FIRs, the 
FIRs often were “distorted or poorly recorded” 
according to the “will and whim” of the police 
officers.511    
The failure to register FIRs or adequately register 
information of sexual violence had serious implica-
tions for the criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions.  First, state actors denied victims, including 
the victims of Punjab and Kashmir, the most acces-
sible mechanism to initiate a criminal investiga-
tion by refusing to file FIRs.  These victims were 
forced to report the crimes to local magistrates, a 
“cumbersome” process that consumes “time and 
money.”512  Second, authorities impeded the timely 
collection of critical physical and testimonial 
evidence by delaying the initiation of the criminal 
investigation.  Despite timely complaints about 
the attack, for example, authorities filed the FIR 
in Kashmir after a two-week delay.  Investigators 
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used this delay to question the victims’ credibility. 
Finally, poorly recorded FIRs undermined efforts 
to identify perpetrators and prove offenses.  After 
the Gujarat violence, some investigating officers 
refused to record the names of the accused in the 
FIR.  It is reasonable to assume that this failure to 
register victim and witness statements explains in 
part why, out of the approximately 5,000 to 10,000 
armed individuals participating in the attack, only 
62 were charged, and only one was convicted of a 
sexual crime.  
Although police officers had the authority to arrest 
suspects of cognizable offenses without a court 
order, authorities refused to exercise that authority 
even in cases where they witnessed the crimes.  In 
Odisha, for example, police did not detain members 
of the mob that had raped redact, paraded her half-
naked through the streets, and left her at the police 
outpost.
The case examples reveal that victims who reported 
acts of sexual violence were stigmatized, harassed, 
and even attacked.  The case files do not indicate 
that disciplinary actions were brought against 
officers who failed to file FIRs or properly investi-
gate procedures.  The lack of prosecution promotes 
impunity and hinders the ability to ensure full 
redress for the victims.  
The duty to protect women’s human rights at all 
times and advance substantive gender equality is 
enshrined by international law.513  Under interna-
tional law, state agents are obligated to investigate 
crimes of gender-based violence even if the victim 
or the victim’s relatives do not file a complaint.514 
“[C]onflicts exacerbate existing gender inequali-
ties, placing women at heightened risk of various 
forms of sexual and gender-based violence by both 
state and non-state actors.”515  In times of conflict, 
women may be less likely to report violations 
themselves.  If a victim does make a statement, 
investigating authorities should be sensitive to the 
trauma victims suffered.516  The failure to investi-
gate and punish gender-based violence can foster 
further violence against women.517
Collection and Preservation of 
Evidence
Under relevant international standards, state 
authorities who conduct an investigation must 
attempt to recover and preserve the physical 
evidence related to the crime, including samples 
of blood, hair, fibers, threads, and other clues, and 
identify possible witnesses to obtain their state-
ments.518  Moreover, the scene of the crime must 
be protected and searched exhaustively, and com-
petent professionals should undertake forensic 
examinations that use appropriate and effective 
procedures.519
physical and testimonial evidence
“ Court records and reports indicate that officials who diligently investigated the incidents were offered bribes, punished, or 
removed from the investigation to shield per-
petrators from criminal prosecution.
The record indicates that authorities investigating 
the examples discussed in this Report failed to 
adequately preserve the crime scene, collect physical 
evidence, or interview witnesses.  In Gujarat, the 
first investigating officer did not recover weapons, 
or identify the source of the fuels used to burn 
victims, or preserve remains.  The second investi-
gating officer neglected to take statements from 
hospitalized victims and did not visit the relief 
camps where victims had fled.  According to the 
court judgment, “the entire police record of state-
ments [wa]s suspect and unreliable.”520  According 
to Amnesty International, the Gujarat investiga-
tions “were marred by . . . the investigating agencies’ 
refusal to examine crucial evidence including 
official telephone records, and the destruction of 
evidence linking key political leaders to the 
violence.”521  In Kashmir, despite an entire village of 
eye-witnesses, torn and bloodied clothes, and dis-
carded liquor bottles, the investigating officer 
closed the investigation “for want of evidence.”522 
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Finally, investigating officers in Odisha returned to 
the site of the rape a week after the incident to, by 
which time they collected material of “no eviden-
tiary value.” 523
In 2013, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Killings “found that witnesses [in India] are often 
intimidated and threatened.”524  No witness pro-
tection existed in India at the time of the incidents 
discussed in this Report and many witnesses were 
afraid to make statements to investigators, particu-
larly in areas of armed conflict where state actors 
participated or were complicit in the incident.  In 
the Gujarat case, “21 accused were acquitted due 
inter alia to the reported refusal of 37 witnesses 
for the prosecution to testify.”525  redact in Odisha 
indicated that she was hesitant to cooperate with 
the police investigation because she not did want 
to be “revictimized by the Odisha police.”526  
Court records and reports indicate that officials 
who diligently investigated the incidents were 
offered bribes, punished, or removed from the 
investigation to shield perpetrators from criminal 
prosecution.  Following the attacks in Gujarat, five 
different police officers from three different police 
branches were charged with the investigation 
between 2002 and 2008.  The NHRC determined 
that there was a “‘widespread lack of faith in the 
integrity of the investigating process, not[ing] that 
numerous allegations had been made . . . that ‘senior 
political personalities’ sought to ‘influence’ inves-
tigations by remaining present in police stations” 
during interviews and investigative work.527  
Similarly, in Kashmir, when the first investiga-
tor concluded that the victims made a prima facie 
showing of rape, the Director General of Police 
reassigned the investigation to a second investiga-
tor.  In total, three different officers in the course of 
five months were assigned to lead the investigation, 
each one starting “afresh.”528  After a judicial officer 
wrote detailed letters to the head of the Kashmir 
civil authority and to the Superintendent of Police 
in Kupwara urging immediate action, he was 
transferred.  He later reported that he “was offered 
every kind of incentive in terms of political offers, 
promotion . . . [and] money,” in order to “alter the 
findings of the report.”529  After refusing to change 
the report, he was told by an army official: “You are 
on the hit list of the army.”530 
International law requires States to “[i]nvesti-
gate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly 
and impartially . . . .”531  Law enforcement officers 
are required “to carry out the investigation with 
utmost objectivity and impartiality.  The whole 
process must be free from any discriminatory rea-
soning or bias.”532  The case studies indicate that 
in several instances, the Indian State did not meet 
this standard.
forensic evidence 
“ The failure to collect and preserve physical, testimonial, and forensic evidence in these cases materially damaged the inves-
tigations and hindered prosecutions. 
Prior to 2000, Indian medical personnel performed 
forensic medical examinations of rape victims only 
upon request by the police or court.  Women who 
went directly to a hospital after a rape were often 
“denied this crucial medicolegal examination.”533  In 
addition, according to Amnesty International, “[w]
hile there are detailed standards for the gathering 
of medical evidence to support claims of . . . rape 
and sexual violence, the availability of competent 
medical examiners [in India] who can undertake 
such examinations in an appropriately sensitive 
and professional manner is often not available, 
especially in conflict situations.”534  Protection 
from retaliation for medical examiners does not 
exist.535 
Authorities failed to gather forensic evidence, 
conducted exams in an untimely manner, or dis-
regarded results.  In Punjab, doctors refused to 
examine redact and in Gujarat and Kashmir 
medical examiners failed to conduct forensic 
exams or excluded results from their testimony 
at trial.  The judgment in the Odisha case criti-
cized the medical officer for negligence in failing 
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to provide results in a timely manner.  Finally, an 
investigative report of the mass rapes in Kashmir 
disregarded the medical exam results of thirty-two 
women conducted three weeks after the incident 
that determined the women had been “repeatedly 
raped.”536  The report stated that “[s]uch a delayed 
medical examination proves nothing.”537  
Medical examinations were also conducted in a 
manner that resulted in unreliable evidence.  No 
standard for forensic medical exams existed at the 
time of the incidents discussed in this Report.538 
At the time, the “two-finger test,” often was used by 
medical examiners to assess whether a rape victim 
is “habituated to sexual intercourse” by testing 
the laxity of the vaginal canal although the test is 
unreliable.  In Odisha, redact was subjected to the 
“two-finger test” during her medical examination, 
despite Supreme Court decisions and government 
protocols that rejected the test’s validity.
International standards require thorough col-
lection of forensic evidence by “competent law 
enforcement officials trained in forensics or sup-
ported by specialized personnel . . . .”539  Specially 
trained staff must conduct forensic exams in a 
manner that avoids re-traumatization and humili-
ation of the victim.540  Investigators “must take the 
victim’s particular situation into consideration and 
make every effort to respect and to protect his or 
her privacy and, as far as possible, to avoid any 
re-traumatization.”541 
“ Without reliable evidence gathered in compliance with national and interna-tional standards, few perpetrators of crimes 
of sexual violence were identified, arrested, 
charged, and convicted.
The failure to collect and preserve physical, testi-
monial, and forensic evidence in these cases mate-
rially damaged the investigations and hindered 
prosecutions.  Without reliable evidence gathered 
in compliance with national and international 
standards, few perpetrators of crimes of sexual 
violence were identified, arrested, charged, and 
convicted.  Lack of standardization, training, and 
access to competent forensic exams increased 
barriers to justice for victims and further trauma-
tized them.
Timeliness of Court Proceedings
“ A state’s consistent failure to do so when women are disproportionately the victims amounts to unequal and discrimina-
tory treatment, and constitutes a violation 
of the state’s obligation to guarantee women 
equal protection of the law.
Indian law requires prompt filing of the First Infor-
mation Report and the immediate investigation of 
cognizable offenses, like rape, is mandatory.  The 
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of per-
petrators of the acts of sexual violence documented 
in this Report were affected by serious and unjusti-
fied delays.  The first victim statements, for 
example, were taken three weeks after the incident 
in Kashmir, and five months after the incident in 
Punjab.  In Odisha, police did not visit the site 
where redacted was raped until a week after the 
incident, at which point the crime scene had been 
altered and the Scientific Officer was unable to 
collect reliable physical evidence.
Prosecution was also substantially delayed, or the 
crimes were never prosecuted.  In Punjab, redact 
filed her initial complaint in 1989 and, the court 
issued the convictions in 1997—eight years later. 
During those eight years, redact attended more 
than 80 court hearings and lived in hiding for fear 
of retribution while officers allegedly tortured her 
family members and burned her home.  The con-
victions did not become final until 2013—twenty-
four years after the rape.  Similarly, in Gujarat, from 
2002 to 2008, five different officers conducted “inef-
fective and unreliable” investigations.  The Special 
access to justice for women
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Court judge delivered his judgment in 2012—ten 
years after the initial attack.  The criminal courts of 
Kashmir never prosecuted or punished any of the 
alleged perpetrators of the mass rapes and police 
filed an official closure report with the court in 
2013—twenty-two years after the attacks. 
India has an international obligation to conduct 
prompt and impartial investigations and prose-
cute, and punish perpetrators of sexual violence.542 
Delays result in frustration and exacerbate the 
vulnerability of victims to threats and intimida-
tion.543 Prompt investigations and executions of 
final judgment are “indispensible” to a court’s suc-
cessful functioning.544  The UN Human Rights 
Committee has not provided a standard defini-
tion of promptness but assessed the issue on case-
by-case basis, finding, for example, that a delay of 
three months in opening an investigation violated 
the timeliness standard.545  Trial proceedings must 
also be completed with undue delay.  Proceedings 
that required two and a half, six, or ten years to 
complete have been considered a violation of the 
ICCPR.546  A State’s failure to promptly investi-
gate crimes that disproportionately impact women 
constitutes unequal and discriminatory treatment 
and violates the State’s obligation to ensure that 
the law equally protects women.”547 
State Agents and Legal Immunity
Impunity has been defined as: “the impossibility, 
de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of 
human rights violations to account.”548  In India, 
impunity for members of state security forces 
exists as the result of practice and law.  The Indian 
Code of Criminal Procedure requires the national 
government to authorize the arrest of any member 
of the armed forces or the prosecution of public 
officials, including police officers and members of 
the armed forces.  According to the Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial Killings, this provision 
“has led to a context where public officers evade 
liability as a matter of course, which encourages 
a culture of impunity and further recurrence of 
violations.”549  Human Rights Watch reports that 
“[e]ven in the exceptional case in which action is 
taken, the punishment most often consists of tem-
porary suspension or transfer of the offending 
officer to another police station.”550  
Police officers also enjoy “de facto impunity” based 
on “a code of silence” and fear of police retaliation.551 
UN experts have found that victims or their 
family members who attempt to file First Infor-
mation Reports with police may be subjected to 
“threatening treatment . . . which dissuade[s] them 
from complaining and impede[s] the account-
ability of State agents.”552  In Punjab, for example, 
the trial court stated police officers had “harassed 
and tortured” potential witnesses “so as to prevent 
them” from testifying in redact’s support.553  redact 
also alleged that police officers burned her home 
and tortured her relatives in order to compel her 
to withdraw her complaint. The use of fear and 
terror not only impacts the victims but also may 
influence investigating authorities, prosecutors, 
and judges.  In Kashmir, the District Magistrate 
discovered that he was “on the hit list of the army” 
after refusing to change his report about the mass 
rapes.554  Doctors in Punjab refused to examine the 
victim and in Gujarat did not document or testify 
to evidence of rape at trial.
Residents of Kashmir and other “disturbed” regions 
of India are doubly affected under the controversial 
Armed Forces ( Jammu & Kashmir) Special Powers 
Act (AFSPA).  The AFSPA provides military offi-
cials with broad powers to arrest, enter, search, and 
seize, without warrant, and to use lethal force.555 
Section 7 of the AFSPA states:
No prosecution, suit or other legal proceed-
ing shall be instituted, except with the previous 
sanction of the Central Government, against 
any person in respect of anything done or pur-
ported to be done in exercise of the powers con-
ferred by this Act.556
The AFSPA, passed in 1958 and expanded in 1972, 
grants the national government and state gover-
nors the power to declare areas “disturbed”557 and 
therefore subject to the AFSPA.  The national gov-
ernment rarely permits prosecutions in disturbed 
areas.558  In 2004, a special committee established 
by the national government concluded that the act 
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had “become a symbol of oppression, an object of 
hate and an instrument of discrimination.”559  The 
CEDAW committee has repeatedly urged India 
“to abolish or reform the Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act and to ensure that investigation and 
prosecution of acts of violence against women by 
the military in disturbed areas and during deten-
tion or arrest is not impeded.”560  Despite years of 
domestic and international protest and criticism, 
India continues to defend the act.561 
The incidents of sexual violence described by this 
Report are prima facie violations of international 
human rights law.  Some of these acts of violence 
potentially also constitute international crimes.  A 
State’s duty to prosecute perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes and human rights violations extends 
to all persons irrespective of their political position 
or military authority.  Human rights bodies have 
established that 
all amnesty provisions, provisions on pre-
scription and the establishment of measures 
designed to eliminate responsibility are inad-
missible, because they are intended to prevent 
the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for serious human rights viola-
tions such as torture, extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary execution and forced disappear-
ance, all of them prohibited because they 
violate non-derogable rights . . . recognized 
by international human rights law.562
Effective Remedy 
The case examples illustrate the inattentiveness of 
Indian institutions and authorities to the psycho-
logical, medical, moral, and material consequences 
suffered by the victims of sexual violence, their 
families, and their communities. At every stage of 
the criminal process, from the filing of First Infor-
mation Reports to the collection of physical and 
forensic evidence, and the bringing of criminal 
charges, victims encountered impediments and 
delays to access to justice.  Rather than generating 
a reparatory or rehabilitative effect, the criminal 
justice process subjected victims to “secondary 
victimization.”563 
Victims of serious violations of international law 
have a right to an effective remedy.564  Victims are 
entitled to equal and effective access to justice; 
adequate, effective, and prompt reparation for harm 
suffered; and access to relevant information con-
cerning violations and reparation mechanisms.565 
Full and effective reparation includes restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and 
guarantees of non-repetition.566  Victims of human 
rights violations are entitled to prompt redress 
for the harm they have suffered567 through resti-
tution and compensation.568  Monetary damages 
are “adequate” when they are “proportionate to the 
gravity of the human rights violation . . . and to the 
suffering of the victim and the family.”569  Monetary 
damages should account for physical or mental 
harm, lost opportunities, material damages, loss of 
earnings, and costs required for legal assistance.570
“ Although Indian security forces and public officials participated in or tolerated the attacks in Odisha, Kashmir, Punjab, and 
Gujarat, the Indian government has neither 
recognized responsibility nor officially apolo-
gized to the victims.
Under Indian law, a court may impose criminal 
sanctions in the form of payment of a fine by the 
perpetrator or compensation to the victim by the 
government.571  The vast majority of victims and 
their families discussed in the Report did not 
receive monetary compensation for the harm 
suffered.  Authorities in Kashmir, for example, 
have not implemented the High Court recommen-
dation to “explore the possibility” of compensation 
to the villagers.572  In Punjab, redacted was never 
compensated for damages incurred.  The govern-
ment compensated one victim of the Gujarat 
massacre after numerous inquiries from the victim’s 
lawyers and months of delay. 
Other avenues of judicial redress have also proven 
ineffective. Through Public Interest Litigation 
(PIL), for example, the Indian Supreme Court 
access to justice for women
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can review a legal matter suo motu that implicates 
a large number of “economically disadvantaged” 
people.573  The PIL system has no formal pleading 
requirements or standing requirements and the 
Court may initiate a PIL suo motu.  The Court has 
significant remedial authority to order compensa-
tion and rehabilitation.574  Procedural flexibility 
has not ensured the effectiveness of PIL as avenue 
of redress. The PIL petition filed in April 2013, 
twenty-two years after the incident in Kashmir, 
for example, was deemed “premature” by the High 
Court.575 
In some cases involving violations of fundamental 
rights, the Supreme Court of India has ordered 
states to suspend public officials or impose other 
disciplinary actions.576  In the past, army and para-
military personnel have been dismissed, demoted, 
or reprimanded for “unexplained abuses,” including 
rape.577  The National Human Rights Commis-
sion (NHRC) and the National Commission for 
Minorities (NCM) may recommend disciplin-
ary proceedings against officials upon determin-
ing that a human rights violation has occurred.578 
Following the Gujarat violence, for example, the 
NHRC recommended that “action[s] should be 
initiated to identify and proceed against [public 
servants] who have failed to act appropriately to 
control the violence in its incipient stages, or to 
prevent its escalation thereafter.”579  Addition-
ally, the NCM requested that the Government of 
Gujarat punish officers who did not perform their 
duties during the communal violence.580  However, 
the government has failed to initiate disciplinary 
actions against police officers or military personnel 
in any of the case examples. 
Indian law does not provide rehabilitation for the 
victim in the form of long-term physical or psy-
chological care following an act of sexual violence. 
None of the victims had access to psychologi-
cal care or medical care provided by the State. 
Indeed, redact was turned away when she sought 
medical attention in Punjab.  Yet experts attest that 
physical and psychological rehabilitation is integral 
to facilitating the reintegration and readaption of 
victims of sexual violence to society.581  Rehabilita-
tion restores the individual’s full health and repu-
tation after the traumatic experience, and without 
it, the victim risks experiencing long-term negative 
consequences, such as isolation and economic 
hardship.582
Although Indian security forces and public offi-
cials participated in or tolerated the attacks in 
Odisha, Kashmir, Punjab, and Gujarat, the Indian 
government has neither recognized responsibility 
nor officially apologized to the victims.  Indeed, in 
Punjab, at least one of redact’s attackers, the head 
of the Station House, remained on police payroll 
during his incarceration.  In Gujarat, women 
have been unable to return home and continue to 
live in Muslim enclaves even eight years after the 
massacre.583  Indian authorities have failed to imple-
ment a 2010 recommendation by the CEDAW 
Committee to promote reconciliation by creating 
a truth and reconciliation commission to investi-
gate the Gujarat massacre.584  The lack of measures 
of satisfaction, including official recognition of 
wrongdoing, can have long-term negative conse-
quences as “not infrequently, the social reaction [to 
victims] is indifference or avoidance leading to a 
silence that is detrimental to the victims, produc-
ing isolation and mistrust.”585
Human rights law provides a holistic, victim-
centered approach to redress that encompasses 
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfac-
tion, and guarantees of non-repetition.586   It is not 
enough assume that compensation alone restores 
the victim to his or her prior position but rather, 
a broad range of remedies are necessary to provide 
redress to the harmed individual.587 
Conclusion and 
Recommendations
This Report identifies common obstacles faced 
by Indian women in seeking effective redress for 
crimes of sexual violence committed in the context 
of social upheaval and armed conflict. Although 
some of the victims of the violent acts described 
by this Report were provided a measure of justice, 
none fully realized their rights as enshrined 
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by international law. It is imperative that India 
reduces high rates of impunity by enacting insti-
tutional and legal reforms. The vulnerability and 
suffering of victims, their families, and their com-
munities and the recurrence of sexual violence is 
a certainty as long as impunity is the rule and not 
the exception in these kinds of cases. India took 
an important step to address the pervasiveness of 
sexual violence by enacting the 2013 Anti-Rape 
Act; however India should do more to prevent 
sexual violence and protect the victims. India must 
seize on existing political will and international 
attention to the issue of sexual violence against 
women to strengthen its laws and institutions so 
that they serve all Indians, including religious and 
ethnic minorities. The following recommenda-
tions for actions by the Indian State aim to address 
common weaknesses of the national legal system 
that obstruct full realization of women’s rights.
In particular, India should
* Amend Indian criminal law and employ interna-
tional criminal and human rights legal standards 
to define rape and related provisions as a violation 
of bodily integrity and a crime of violence, rather 
than a crime against modesty. Indian criminal law 
should also recognize the coercive circumstances in 
custodial situations and armed conflict.
* Adopt legislation that provides a comprehensive, 
equitable, and efficient system of reparations for 
victims of sexual violence in internal conflict or 
incidences of mass violence. India should provide 
adequate, timely, and comprehensive reparations to 
victims of gender-based crimes and their families, 
including monetary compensation; rehabilitation, 
such as medical care and psychological and psy-
chosocial support; measures of satisfaction, such as 
public acknowledgment of wrongdoing, memorial-
ization, and historical analysis of commitments; 
and measures of guarantees of non-repetition, 
including effective criminal investigation and the 
prosecution and punishment of those responsible. 
* Ensure acts of sexual violence in areas of internal 
conflict and incidences of mass violence are exhaus-
tively and effectively investigated and those respon-
sible are promptly prosecuted and punished by a 
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal. 
India must repeal legislation, such as the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 (with subse-
quent amendments), and sections of the Indian 
Code of Criminal Procedure, including Section 
197, that do not permit the trial or prosecution 
of paramilitary and military personnel without 
government permission.588 These laws encumber 
the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of 
public officials and members of the armed forces. 
In particular, it is imperative that India strengthens 
its efforts to effectively investigate and prosecute 
historic crimes, such as the acts of sexual violence 
that occurred in J&K, to signal a break with the 
legacy of impunity and ensure victims’ access to 
justice. To this end, India should increase resources 
to the judicial system to address the backlog of 
cases and establish an effective protection program 
for victims and witness. 
* Impose criminal and administrative sanctions on 
public officials, including elected officials, military 
personnel, and police officers who obstruct inves-
tigations or intimidate, harass, or assault victims 
and witnesses of sexual violence that occurred 
during internal conflict or mass violence. Authori-
ties should initiate disciplinary proceedings against 
public officials who perpetrate or fail in their 
duties to respond to sexual violence, including 
investigating officials who fail to follow investiga-
tive procedure by, for example, refusing to register 
First Information Reports. India also should adopt 
steps to dismantle the esprit du corps, prevalent 
among police and military forces, that contrib-
utes to a climate of impunity in which members of 
the police and military may harass and intimidate 
victims and witnesses or their families without 
consequence.
* Implement specialized investigative units, pros-
ecutors, and courts to respond to, investigate, and 
prosecute acts of sexual violence in internal conflict 
and incidences of mass violence. India must ensure 
that individuals responsible for inciting and com-
mitting acts of sexual and collective violence are 
held criminally accountable. India should increase 
institutional capacity to effectively prosecute and 
punish perpetrators of sexual violence and care for 
access to justice for women
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victims of conflict and mass violence by creating 
specialized police units to investigate crimes of 
sexual violence, increasing the number of female 
police officers and medical examiners, establish-
ing specialized units within prosecutors’ offices, 
and strengthening specialized courts to address 
the backlog of cases and ensure the independence 
and impartiality of investigations and prosecu-
tions.  India must ensure that the rights of prison-
ers serving sentences are respected.  
* Adopt effective witness-victim protection measures 
to enable victims and witnesses of sexual violence, 
including state officials, in areas of internal conflict 
and incidences of mass violence to participate fully 
and safely in proceedings. Measures must take into 
account the particular vulnerabilities of victims of 
sexual violence in these contexts and may include 
relocation assistance, privacy protections, and 
other security measures to ensure protection from 
retaliation or intimidation, and physical and psy-
chological safety.
* Train officials involved in sexual violence cases, 
including police, medical personnel, and judicial 
officers, for the unique challenges of working in 
areas of internal conflict and mass violence and 
to appropriately support victims and sensitively 
conduct their duties. This should include effective 
efforts to standardize medical forensic examination 
procedures and train medical personnel to com-
petently conduct exams. For example, although 
Indian courts have rejected the legal validity of 
the “two-finger” vaginal test, it is still used. India 
should take steps to eliminate practices that re-
traumatize victims of sexual violence. 
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